

NOTES ON FOREIGN POLICY FORECAST

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At last Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, who was the first man of his day at Athens, and the greatest orator and statesman, came forward and advised as follows:

... The movement of events is often as wayward and incomprehensible as the course of human thought; and this is why we ascribe to chance whatever belies our calculation.

Thucidides, *The Peloponnesian War*, I. 140.
B. C. 432 *

SHORT-RANGE OR TELIC FORECAST

1. Forecast

Wise statesmanship is built on foresight and more than often on humane moderation. And foresight means here understanding of human nature as well as the nature of society, realistic evaluation of facts, and sensing the trends, humanity moves. To maintain peace among nations foresight is needed. This means not only understanding of the present, of the interrelationship of facts, but also understanding of the consequences of those data and anticipation of events of the future. Then and only then thought and humane judgement should guide identification of goals which in turn lead to decision, and decision is followed by actions or policies.

But foresight, Thucidides teaches us, is at war with chance.¹ Foresight is no certainty. The more rationally man thinks and acts, the more predictive he is, although irrational, cruel goals may also make a man "predictive", as Hitler and Atilla were in their evil. When the Spartans considered war or peace, the wise Athenian envoys reminded them: "Think, while there is time, the unpredictable nature of war; and how when protracted it generally ends in becoming a mere matter of chance, over which neither of us can have any control, the event being equally unknown, and equally hazardous to both."² Thus foresight must consider the nature of chance. But chance again

* B. Jowett trans'ation.

¹ Michael Grant, in *The Ancient Historians* (Scribner, New York, 1970), comments in a brilliant manner on chance and foresight on "War of Chance and Foresight" in Thucidides writings. See chapter 6, "Power and Politics", p. 102 ff. especially pp. 106-107.

² Thucidides, *ibid.* 1.78; this writer has combined the Jowett and R. S. Warner translations.

is frequently a chain of events we failed to perceive, to return to Thucidides: "... we ascribe to chance whatever belies our calculation." Here comes our more modern term "forecast", which is only one of the instruments, modern instruments of foresight, an instrument which may assist wisdom and humanity in judgement and decision, but can never replace them, nor is it tantamount to the latter.

A statesman looks ahead at least a generation. His talent to see and anticipate dangers the future may harbor, permits him to avoid them and maintain peace. A statesman must anticipate the future; the scholar hesitates. But there are exceptions: identification of trends in "quantifiable" areas, such as population growth and employment. And here were the pioneers of social science forecast.

The dominant method in social sciences is the empirical inductive method. In the inductive approach the emphasis is based on facts, on data. The data, the facts, are in the past, not in the future. In this sense our habit of thinking is rather historical. Certain historicism in thinking is implicit in the empirical and inductive method. While the natural scientist may postulate that similar or identical conditions will produce similar changes, the social scientist is frequently hesitant to project his exploration into the future. First of all the causality in social sciences is of a different nature. It is hardly possible to replicate the "causes" or better the causative conditions with equal exactness or even similarity as in natural sciences. Moreover, the future development of society is affected by human goals, values, and also by behavior and psychological needs which we call "irrational" since they escape anticipation and to an extent our present understanding. But in spite of those academic misgivings we do project even extensively our thinking into the unknown future. Government agencies publish the manpower estimates, universities prepare the enrollment estimates, far ahead of time, back in the fifties as far as 1958. The population estimates for the future sound like alarm signals.

Those projections are frequently surprisingly accurate. It might be questionable today whether it is at all possible to conduct a rational social policy without this type of data. In fact, this type of "forecast" corresponds roughly to "probabilities". What we really do in such a case is to explore probabilities of a future time interval. In all those examples we had, however, data which lent themselves to quantification. Not all facts in social sciences can be quantified and it would be a mistake to attempt to limit social sciences to areas which are quantifiable, thus to impose a straightjacket on our thinking.

In the large family of ways and methods of forecasting, we may call it forecasting "sensu largo" (in a broad sense), we may distinguish various levels of probabilities as well as types of forecasting. "Projections" per se suggest the future trend but do not explicate the determinants, the reasons why a given trend appears. Forecast "sensu stricto" (in a narrow sense) tries to identify determinants which result in change of variables or actions.

It is an "educated" guess, a conjecture of those "causal factors" which a) are relevant, and b) have a tendency to continue.

We "look into the future" and explore the future probabilities in everyday life. At every level of social evolution, in a variety of cultures we shall probably always find some kind of exploration of the future or some kind of thinking in terms of future probabilities or expectations. A hunter who leaves his tent early morning, does it because he evaluates a probability of finding an antelope in the plains. Farming, based on seasons is strongly dependent on probability of future harvest. All those activities require some kind of rough estimates of the future or evaluation of probabilities. In addition to natural occurrences which are periodical, man in pre-industrial cultures takes into consideration future happenings which are of social rather than natural or biological quality. A Plain Indian "knows" or better anticipates sun dances, sometimes in spring and sometimes during the summer season. He also anticipates a probability that ceremonials will be attended by other friendly tribes.

2. *Goal Oriented Actions*

The probabilities of an economic forecast of our hunter or farmer are based on the nature of the geographical environment on which their livelihood depends. The Indian anticipates the future celebration since he knows the customs. The demographer predicts increase of population by tracing and analysis of a trend or of a process. Man projects however into the future also his own goals. His goals form his "ends". To achieve them he releases "an action". The action forms the means for the attainment of the goal. The goal oriented individual and his social action are fundamental elements of our understanding of human behavior, moreover in understanding our culture. Our goals are closely related to our standards and norms of conduct as well as to the entire idea system within which we operate. Man by his action attempts to modify the existing conditions or to affect and utilize his environment. On one hand he is affected by a social process and is an "object" of the latter, on the other hand he attempts to master, and influence the process by his actions and acts as a "subject". His is a two-fold role.

The differentiation between process and action is essential. Before we proceed further, at this moment let us fix the ideas. In a sense foreign policies are interrelated actions directed toward certain goals or objectives, which in turn are interrelated or interdependent. Objectives or goals, policies or actions, are the two essential elements of foreign policy analysis. The third element of analysis is an aggregate of "factors": here belong the instruments and conditions of power, as well as ideology. The latter is of course reflected in goals, since goals emanate from ideology. Without instruments of power and favorable conditions determined by distribution of

international power, goals cannot be achieved. The interrelation, more interdependence of all those variables should not be forgotten.

The national or group interests reflected in foreign policy are of course of paramount significance. In an analytical approach, the interest is discussed in evaluation of goals and in the close scrutiny of the ideology, often in "demystification" of those goals and declarations. Lofty ideologies are often covers for brutal actions and definite interests.

The international studies group of the Brookings Institution defined or described the policies or objectives as follows:

To summarize: interests are what a nation feels to be essential to its security and well being; objectives are interests spelled out and made more precise in the light of a current pattern of international relations; policies are thought out courses of action for achieving objectives; and commitments are specific undertakings in support of a given policy. Principles denote the judgments of value and guides to action by which a nation measures the suitability of its own objectives and policies and judges the objectives and policies of other states.

A final possible distinction should be kept in mind: the distinction between the foreign policy of a nation and a nation's foreign policies. The former is used to refer to the complex and dynamic political course that a nation follows in relation to other states. The foreign policy of a nation is more than the sum total of the current forms of its interests and objectives, and the principles of right conduct that it professes.³

3. Goal and Action as Cause and Effect

But let us return to the simple concept of goal and action. Most if not all human behavior is goal oriented. It may be perhaps safer to say that only a fraction of human behavior or human action is oriented toward goals man is fully conscious of. But nonetheless in such a case the goal becomes a "cause" and an action which has been released is an "effect" or a consequence of the former. Now we may postulate that similar causes are prone to produce similar effects. In other words, there is a *probability* that a similar cause will produce a similar effect. This postulates also that in the past experience we had an opportunity to connect a given cause with a given effect. This is a very simple or simplified and rough proposition, it may be however relevant at this stage of our thinking. Thus, the knowledge of the "cause" which is an antecedent gives us the knowledge of a probable effect which is a "sequent". In this sense simple causality has a "predictive" quality of course in terms of probabilities. The information called "cause" or "antecedent" does not tell us what *will* happen but what *may* happen under certain circumstances.

³ *Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy*, 1953-1954, Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., pp. 373-375.

A “cause” of an action called “foreign policy” is related to what we may call the international environment: the existing state of international relations, the structure and nature of those relations as well as distribution of power.⁴ The goal of a foreign policy or the objective is either to maintain the existing conditions or to change them by a system of action, or furthermore to exercise an effect on the general international process. The international environment is not static, it is continuously changing. In a policy of maintenance of peace, of avoiding conflict or reducing tensions it calls for continuous intervention and adjustment.

The fact that the political actor has goals and undertakes action toward achievement of those goals does not necessarily mean that he will arrive there, that he will succeed. Nonetheless understanding of his objectives gives us to a certain extent an understanding of his future or intended actions. In this sense by identification of goals or if clear goals are not present of intent or intentions we may gain a better understanding of his actions. By intentions we understand here a general sense of direction, and orientation rooted in interests, ideologies and also attitudes. In a sense it is a “pre-goal” stage in thinking. The single “cause and effect” perception of relationship of facts, is the simplest and perhaps oldest forecasting model man has invented.

In this particular case, we postulate that “goals”, foreign policy goals are the cause, actions are the effect. But the reader may argue: “But this does not explain the more profound reasons or root causes of the foreign policy such as the nature of the economic interests, historical claims or ideological imperatives.”⁵ My answer to this query is: “I exercise here an arbitrary choice of ‘reduction’ of the area of inquiry. At this stage of inquiry my interest is in goals or intentions and questions where this may lead in terms of actions. In every research, the field of inquiry must be ‘cut’, ‘narrowed down’ or reduced, so must the variables.”

Thus we have arrived at a general proposition: provided the goals are known (or discovered) probable alternative courses of action can be anticipated. The goals, for logical convenience, become “quasi-causes” (but we

⁴ At this point of discussion I shall use a general term of “international environment” for a macro-sociological setting of the complex structure of international relations within which a political actor operates. C.A.W. Manning, (*International Relations*, Paris, Unesco, 1965) uses an apt term “structure of international relations”, an “international milieu” which reflects the multiplicity of interacting elements (particularly power, authority, influence and prestige). Morton Kaplan, in a more abstract approach on a “macrotheoretical” level, analyzes those interrelations as a system (Morton Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics*, New York, Wiley, 1957), also, Morton Kaplan, ed., *New Approaches to International Relations* (St. Martin Press, New York, 1968).

Much earlier, David Hume (*Essays*, ed. T. Green and T. Grose, vol. 1, 1881 “Of Balance of Power”), discovered this environment, milieu or system in the balance of power, which may be traced to much older writings, as evidenced by selections edited by Paul Seabury, in his *Balance of Power*, Chandler, San Francisco, 1965.

⁵ Oscar Uribe Villegas in an original attempt reviews major “root causes” of international politics in *Memoranda sobre causación social y vida internacional*, Escuela Nacional de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, México, 1958.

shall call them causes or better, antecedents) and actions "quasi-effects" (we shall call them effects or sequents).

This proposition is of a general nature and has its application to foreign policy forecast. Two cases below (Section 4) illustrate working of this simple analysis. Two analysts, postulated the goals of Hitler's government. They took his writings, and speeches seriously. Then —to follow their mode of thinking— considered the goals as a kind of an "end-gate" and a cause of probable future actions. In both cases the forecast was surprisingly valid, although most tragic in its consequences.

4. *Successful Forecasts*

A discussion and analysis of successful and unsuccessful foreign policy forecasts in the past is a useful exercise, not without practical significance. I have selected in this essay historical, in terms of current issues, ancient cases because they can be entertained here today without this ardent ideological commitment, the political issues result to often. This is the ancient past and can be dealt with calmly, without strong emotions, although some emotion is always there. Furthermore, the data are available and forecast is validated *ex post facto*, true by hindsight. But after all this is an exercise. Let me mention here only two cases. Colonel Moravetz, a professor in the Czechoslovakia Military Academy, took Hitler's writings seriously and on the basis of those writings identified courageously as early as in 1936 the German foreign policy objectives. He took Hitler's and his party's declarations as a premise of future aggressive actions of the German government. Several years before the conflict he anticipated or rather forecasted directions of Hitler's aggression.

In consequence he suggested rather wisely defensive policies which may have prevented aggression or at least increased chances of defense. It might be of interest to recall today this forgotten book. Moravetz suggested a close alliance of all Eastern European states: of Little Entente, the Balkan states and Poland as well as integration of the armies of those countries. That way a force would be created which could form an element of strength and balance.⁶

Moravetz refers back to past historical experiences and proceeds with a rather technical, geographical and strategic analysis:

The movement of the nations from times immemorial tended from the East to the West, from Asia to the Russian steppes, and thence to Central Europe, predominantly to the Danubian valley and its fertile regions...

Whatever direction we take —from the Apennines Peninsula, from the

⁶ Col. Emanuel Moravetz, *Strategic Importance of Czechoslovakia for Western Europe*, Orbis, Prague, 1936. Czechoslovak Sources and Documents Wz. 13. I shall limit myself to the evaluation of the merit solely of this contribution and do not intend to go beyond it.

Balkans, from the Rhineland, from the Elbe Valley or from the middle reaches of Dnieper—all of these trade and military routes meet on the upper Danube between its confluence with the Enns on the West and the Ipel on the East. The middle portion of the Danube between the Enns and the Ipel thus represents the main military crossroads in Central Europe. Whoever held the middle reach of the Danube dominated as a rule the whole of Central Europe, for it held the key to all the military routes. This applied equally to ancient times as to the Middle Ages, and it holds good to this day. [1936 ed.] To-day the Orient Express runs precisely along the old Rhine Danube line of communication . . .

If Czechoslovakia is a hindrance to the free expansion of Germany to the South, she is equally a hindrance to German expansion to the East. *Let us admit that what Chancellor Hitler says is true, and that the Germans are preparing a great expedition to the East for Russian soil. It is unthinkable that the Poles would permit their land to be a theatre of war between Germany and Russia as it was in the Great War.* (italics ed.) There is thus a possibility of a German-Russian collision only by way of the territories of the Little Entente —of Czechoslovakia and Rumania. From a practical point of view there is possible only the reverse march route from West to East along the old military route of the Tartars: through the Danubian basin via the Eastern Carpathians. This, however, presupposes the subjugation of Czechoslovakia across whose territory, in particular the Gateway of Moravia, it is essential to pass by numerous lines of communication to the Great Hungarian Plain, and thence over the Eastern Carpathians to the Ukrainian Plains. This means that the Germans in conjunction with the Hungarians must first gain possession of the southern slopes of the Sudete-Carpathian range.

Just as it is impossible to advance from the Danubian basin to Constantinople via Yugoslavia without suppressing Italy, so also it is impossible to advance eastwards from the Danubian basin without the neutralisation of Poland. Such neutralisation may be of two kinds: political and military. Political neutralisation means a treaty of friendship and alliance. A treaty of friendship enabling Germany to dominate the Balkans would be complete subjection for Italy. Equally complete subjection for Poland would be implied in a treaty that brought the Germans to the Black Sea.

We repeat that the advance of Germany to the Black Sea does not lead to world dominion, and that it would meet with much greater resistance than advance southwards to the Balkans and to Constantinople, since Soviet Russia stands in Germany's way to the Black Sea. That is a much stronger power than Italy. The advance of Germany into the Ukraine, where she would find herself involved in severe fighting is unthinkable without complete assurance of her flank on the North, that is the neutralisation of Poland, which could only, like the neutralisation of Italy, be carried out thoroughly by force of arms.

The liquidation of Czechoslovakia would enable Germany to transfer the center of gravity of her actions against Poland from the Baltic littoral to the Northern slopes of the Sudetes and the Carpathians —against Cracow and Poznan. *We will not consider the possibility of a German-*

Soviet compact under which the Germans, penetrating to Poland via the Gateway of Moravia, would signify complete catastrophe for the Poles. (italics ed.) In this case help from Rumania would have as little value as would help from Italy or from Yugoslavia were Germany to attack Venice from the North...

The Little Entente headed by Czechoslovakia which is projected to the crests of the Sudetes and the Carpathians plays the main role in the two German manoeuvres in the direction of the "transversal Eurasian axis", whether the route be the Northern or the Southern one. (italics ed.) In case of the Southern manoeuvre (via the Danubian basin) Germany would come into collision direct with the Little Entente and its vanguard Czechoslovakia. In case of the Northern manoeuvre (via Poland and the Ukraine) Germany would have Czechoslovakia and Rumania in her flank, just as she would have Czechoslovakia in her flank if she left the Alpine crests for an attack on Venice.

As long as Czechoslovakia exists, the "Bohemian Basin" represents a vanguard thrust forward as defence against the Northwest. Under its protection the forces destined to defend the approach to the Danubian basin or to check the manoeuvre to the East by flank movement may freely deploy in the Danubian area.

As soon as Czechoslovakia were overthrown the Danubian basin would become a basis for German offensive in three directions: against Italy, against the Balkans and against Poland and Soviet Russia. (italics ed.) Who will be the most seriously affected by the fact that the Germans advance along the "transversal Eurasian axis"?

We have already referred to the plans for a German invasion of the Ukraine, in which Czechoslovakia and Rumania would be the Southern march route from the Danubian basin as Poland would be for a Northern march route from the Vistula basin. Czechoslovakia in resisting German influence, which could very easily change from political to strategic influence (italics ed.), renders service to the security of the Soviet Union in case the Union should have to place the centre of gravity of its forces outside Europe, that is, if it should be compelled to fight on several fronts at once...

Should the Soviet Union be defeated and Germany really succeed in securing territory by the Black Sea this would mean a considerable advance on Germany's part along the "transversal Eurasian axis" on the Northern shore of the Black Sea. *England has no use for a weak Russia since a too strong Germany would in truth dominate the 'transversal Eurasian axis' on both sides of the Black Sea, which would become a German Sea.* (italics ed.) A weak Russia would mean a too strong Japan in the East, and a too strong Japan means for England the loss of her position in China and perhaps also in the East Indies.

Czechoslovakia and Rumania protect not only the routes to the Danubian basin but also those to the Ukraine. It is therefore comprehensible that Soviet Russia should have an interest in Czechoslovakia's existence, and should lay stress upon friendly relations with the Little Entente. If the Danubian basin should fall under the influence of Germany those plans of operation would speedily be realized that were drafted prior

to 1914 for the combined German, Austrian, and Rumanian forces by Generals von Moltke and Conrad...⁷

Moravetz's book was published in 1936, it was probably written in 1934-35, about 4-5 years before things have happened. Of course, details of forecast do not necessarily fit into the future history. Nonetheless, Moravetz correctly anticipated a general pattern of aggression of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The French Yellow Book which covers documents of the period from 1938-39, contains *inter alia* a striking forecast made in December 1938. The French Minister in Sofia reports about his conversation with the Bulgarian Prime Minister Kossieivanov. After all the complimentary remarks which the cautious Bulgarian made to the French representative both about Germany and France he went straight ahead in predicting Hitler's march through Eastern as well as Southeastern Europe. In that short report we read about Kossieivanov's anticipation of the sequence of Hitler's aggression and conquest which took place two years later between 1940-41. Like in Moravetz's forecasting there might be an error in detail, perhaps a difference in a sequence of aggression, but generally the future course of action, which reflects Hitler's intentions is bluntly stated in this short report.⁸

Here is this short document. The forecast of the Soviet/German Alliance and aggression of Poland is not a theoretically elaborate document, but is quite accurate, and was made about 15 months ahead of the fateful days of September 1939. The Bulgarian Prime Minister indicated indirectly that the Balkans are next on the list.

Mr. Ristelheuber, French Minister in Sofia,
Mr. Georges Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sofia, December 16, 1938

In the course of a recent conversation that I had with the Prime Minister, the latter mentioned the great satisfaction he felt in consequence of the recent Franco-German declaration. He said that it had not come as a surprise to him. When Baron von Neurath passed through Sofia nearly two years ago, he stressed the very ardent desire of his Government to arrive at an understanding with France, as there were no questions at issue to divide the two countries. He had even confessed himself pained at the lack of enthusiasm with which Paris had responded to these advances.

As for Germany, while her desire for expansion eastwards was obvious, it was perhaps a mistake to imagine that her first objective would be Southeastern Europe. It appeared to him that Poland was quite menaced.

⁷Moravetz's as above, excerpts from pp. 10-59.

⁸*French Yellow Book*, (1938-39), Reynold and Hitchcock, New York, 1940, pp. 45-46.

The Polish-Soviet rapprochement constituted a defence against this danger. But the two Slav peoples hated each other so profoundly that their understanding could only be ephemeral and artificial. On the contrary, M. Kossieivanov did not consider as impossible an understanding between the U.S.S.R. and the Reich, especially if the Commintern agreed to tone down its propaganda. Such had always been the dream of a section of the German General Staff. In that event a fourth partition of Poland would allow Germany to proceed with her forceful drive eastwards.

Ristelheuber

Now let us look closer to the logic and major assumptions of these forecasts supposing that the Bulgarian had some intelligence: if he did, he took it seriously. Both Moravetz and Kossieivanov took Hitler's writings and speeches seriously at a time when high-placed European statesmen were trying to explain to the public what Hitler says he really doesn't mean. While the British Prime Minister was trying at the eve of the war to assure the people about the "peace of our time", a colonel in the service of a weak and minor East European democracy, and on the other hand the prime minister of a small Balkan kingdom chose a reverse assumption, a logical assumption, that Hitler really means what he writes and talks. The logical assumptions were correct. In consequence —from here the reasoning might have followed— the objectives expressed in his books and in the writings of other Nazi theoreticians were true objectives. They were as it is well-known, expansion of German territory (*Lebens Raum*) especially all over Easter Europe and Russia. Thus, it follows in a simplified mode of thinking, those objectives or foreign policy goals —expansion— become a "cause" or better an antecedent, from which a sequent (effect), a future course of action was forecasted. They were forecasted in a logical rational manner. While the goal by itself might be conceived due to some irrational or even morbid psychological needs, its implementation requires rational action. Whatever the reason of Hitler's objectives were, the implementation required rational pragmatic actions. The course of action was predicted in his book by Moravetz and was identified in a conversation by Kossieivanov. If the way of reasoning was as described above, then a simple causal model was in this case the logical "mode" of this forecast. We may accept at this point the causal concept as a working concept, a working proposition. In this sense a cause is a set of conditions which may probably produce or result in another set of conditions which differs from the former. What we call here "cause" is usually for the sake of convenience rather than a logical accuracy a composite of interdependent causative variables. A "goal" or "decision" is in consequence only an "end-point", an "end-gate" of this aggregate, and a starting point which triggers the action. Nonetheless, in this forecasting model, we assume that the objectives (goals) of a political actor form the "cause", an antecedent and we anticipate or *forecast* actions (sequent) toward goal achievement.

5. The “Predictive” — “Non-Predictive” Cases

This brings us close to the problem of “levels of predictability”. What I mean here by predictability is in fact various degrees of probability. Since one hundred thirty years, since Quetelet wrote his *Social Physics* (1835), we know that certain social processes are, and we may add also collective behavior, predictable in terms of probabilities. The yearly rate of birth or mortality, the deaths and births per thousand of a given population has a relatively high level of probability. Ludwig Gumplowicz, more than half a century ago argued convincingly that collective behavior is far more predictable than individual behavior.

Now let us take other cases of relatively high predictability. Everybody knows that if one dials the letter O in the telephone, the operator will answer. Should I dial in New York the number 911, sooner or later a police officer will answer. I know that the trains listed on the Long Island Railroad Directory will leave relatively on time, they might be sometimes late but usually they will leave close to the hour which is indicated. I know also that on Sunday there will be a service at Saint Patrick's Cathedral on Fifth Avenue. It is highly probable that the cafeterias of New York as well as the movies will be open on Sunday. All this is commonplace and it is known to everyone. It is obvious, and suggests that predictability in certain areas of human relations and activities is obvious, otherwise we could not live in a modern society. I may suggest a further hypothesis: a modern industrial, technological society requires and is based on an ever-growing area of predictable human and social behavior and predictable social relations. On the other hand I cannot tell whether a man who is half drunk and is leaving a bar on Broadway will turn left or right; probably he himself at this moment is unable to say in what direction he will move. The level of the probability could be probably mathematically assigned in terms of “fifty and fifty %” one way or another, but for all practical purposes his behavior is “not predictive”, although theoretically at least, probabilities of his behavior could be suggested. This is aleatory or chance behavior. The drunkard is to an extent “unpredictable”, since we do not expect a “logical choice”, a choice of action related to a conscious and rational objective.

We may roughly divide the whole matter of forecasting into “predictive” and “nonpredictive”. By “predictive” I mean an area of such cases which have different “levels of probabilities” of future actions but suggests certain logical alternatives which are open to an actor or to actors, and probability of a logical choice. “Predictive” in this sense are also certain trends or processes. To move a step further, it may suggest that a relatively high level of probability of what might be called “institutional behavior” in certain cases is not accidental. All “predictive” cases mentioned in this section belong to the “family of institutional behavior”. It is frequently easy to anticipate how an actor in his role as a member of an institution will act although he may act differently in a different role, as a member of another institution

to which he belongs. A policeman may act differently as a policeman and as the father of a family. But institutional behavior has high levels of predictability. I may ask now the question, "why this relatively high predictability": because I know the function of an institution and the objectives it serves, roles which are assigned to personnel. As a matter of logical convenience I may simplify the problem and suggest that the objectives and the nature, function of the institution are the "cause" of the actor's behavior, the effect. The charter of the institution written or unwritten represents the "ideal norms", the ideal behavioral patterns, the ideal expected behavior. The difference between "ideal" type of behavior, as prescribed by norms and by the charter, and the "virtual" behavior of everyday is well known. Knowing this discrepancy, but also knowing something about the functioning and nature of the institution, I may forecast as probable the behavior of actors employed in a given institution, although I am unable to predict, with equal likelihood, a decision in a controversial case, or outcome of horse races. This will, of course, vary with various types of institutions; it will also vary with various cultures. Since the state is an "integral institution" composed of many institutions, since the government is an organ of the institutions of the state, there is, at least in certain areas of certain degree (or a certain probability) or predictability of the reaction or response of the government toward actions of another government. This is, what may be called "mutual institutional behavior", a consequence of interdependence of stimulus and response.

Now, let us tentatively conclude this section. We shall alter somewhat our previous classification, and in consequence modify slightly our terminology. We shall select, for the purpose of our discussion in an arbitrary manner, three types of human behavior. The terms and classification are —we shall admit this here— determined by our objectives: forecasting.

Thus, we shall distinguish:

1. *Aleatory or chance behavior*, which in practical sense means an unpredictable behavior.
2. *Institutional behavior* — behavior exercised by individuals in their role as personnel of the former, as decided upon by responsible officers— belongs to the area of predictive behavior, (of course, within the limits of probabilities of outside or inside pressure and factors which may nullify or modify). In principle, we can predict that there is a considerable probability that the firemen in New York will come when alarmed to a fire disaster. This probability could also be presented in a quantitative manner: e. g. number of cases in which the N. Y. Fire Department responded to the alarm in the last ten years. Similarly, the probability of assistance of members of the municipal police, when alarmed on the telephone number 911 could be expressed in a quantitative method. This is an "Institutional response forecast".

3. *Telic behavior* — this is a goal-oriented behavior, or in terms of our problems, individual or group action directed toward more or less defined objectives. Telic behavior —within limits of probabilities— is predictive behavior. Let us make the major limitation of our provision here: we cannot predict goal achievement, although we may sometimes evaluate what the chances are. What we forecast in fact is only directions, or alternative directions an actor will move in order to achieve his goal. I know, that John intends to go to college and so that a college degree and education is his goal. In consequence, I can forecast that he will try to finish high school. If he succeeds, I can forecast he will try to pass his Regents exams. If he passes his Regents exams, I can further suggest he will apply to a college. Whether he succeeds at every stage in his strategic objectives I do not know. I can evaluate his chances on the basis of my information about John's capabilities and my knowledge of the American educational institutions.

Forecasting in international affairs, forecasting of a foreign policy has to do with telic behavior. Foreign policy is a "telic" goal oriented action or behavior. Peace and war be the goals, but their achievement calls for goal oriented, conscious "telic" action. Without consideration of purpose, of goal, no decision can be made. The goal is implicit in decision, so is action. Those are not separate blocs, but interrelated variables. Bonaparte, Hitler, Mussolini had their goals. Goals of conquest were spelled out at a certain time and Napoleon told about his intentions to conquer Russia to his aide, General Armand de Caulaincourt⁹ —as we can discover from his *Memoirs*— long before he started his campaign. Mussolini had clear goals —to conquer Albania and Abyssinia, Hitler to conquer Eastern Europe and Russia. By early identification of their goals we could forecast their probable action. The structure and direction of those actions, selection of means, staging could have been forecasted on the basis of our understanding of their strategic patterns, international situation and personalities of decision makers and advisors. Of course, not every problem lends itself to such a forecast. Nonetheless, the area of forecasting is by no means something that sounds like witchcraft.

A colleague of mine, a well-known political psychologist argued, while we were marching in academic attire to celebrate inauguration of a new College President, that important as it is, the entire area of human action is unpredictable. "A stomachache", he said, "and a man will change his mind and will remain home instead of going about his business". The ceremonials did not permit to finish our conversation and in all fairness that was the way I understood his argument. But for all the stomachaches Napoleon had, for all the tantrums of a maniacally obsessed Hitler, for all motions of Mussolini, they all were driving at the goals they had projected, and they marched to their objectives by all kinds of devious means. And some

⁹ General de Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza, *With Napoleon in Russia*. The Memoirs of ..., William Universal Library, New York (n. d.), p. 17.

modest people, whether on the left in the Socialist parties or on the right in the British Conservative party —to mention Churchill— forecasted early what *may* happen, and where dictators were driving. There is something to, and some merit in Thomas Huxley's dictum that scientific thinking is an improved and trained "common sense".

The war can be started by half insane political leaders — True. Their insanity is reflected in their goals. But mobilization for war and war itself, as a system of organized, violent actions is a highly complex and difficult enterprise, where human will and determination are paramount, even visible. War is not just a necessary eruption in a nameless historical process. Modern, international aggression involves scheming and planning, mobilizing with a single goal in mind, to break the will of your opponent. The behavior betrays the goal, and the former cannot be reduced to total secrecy. The proper evaluation of political and military behavior is paramount for our survival and seminal in forecast. It calls for more than common sense, and a bit of pessimism (not too much) may help.

6. *The Range of Forecast*

We understand by forecasting only the probabilities of future development and what we explore "is a set of possible outcomes" or the possible alternatives of action.¹⁰ In a social science forecast, it is difficult to identify "all possible outcomes". We do rather explore a set of logical outcomes or alternatives which we may anticipate on the basis of our understanding of man and society. The various cases of forecast mentioned so far differed in: *a*) the "sociological" subject matter, and *b*) the logical structure or "mode" which forecasting in a given case would require. The examples of forecast, of predictability or non-predictability were based on: 1) an analysis of plans or processes, 2) understanding or tentative identification of goals (this mode is related to the former —goal is a consequence of a plan, or a "project" to use Alfred Schutz's term), 3) knowledge of customs, 4) information about institutional behavior (again, customs are usually integrated with institutions), and 5) aleatory or chance behavior.

In addition, the range of the forecast, the time interval involved was practically in every case different. A different time range and the nature of the subject matter may require a different approach and perhaps even a different method of forecasting. A highly tentative forecast of the future of a great civilization is rather of a philosophical, humanistic and intuitive nature, based on historical knowledge, past experience, comparison of various civilizations. Such were and are attempts of Vico, Saint-Simon, Comte,

¹⁰ Prof. G. E. Bates, in his *Probability*, Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1965, p. 1, discusses experiments in probability and he writes "each experiment gives rise to a set of possible outcomes. The set of all possible outcomes of an experiment is called a sample space of probability space of the experiment."

Spengler, Toynbee or more systematic of Morgan. This type of highly tentative, macrosociological penetration into the future may be called "historical forecast" since it requires a broad humanistic approach, and a certain sense of history. In a different way and range, both de Tocqueville and Napoleon III anticipated the future role of the sub-continental nations of America and Russia in world politics. Their "forecast" was based not only on general evaluation of the size and nature of the two states but also on a certain "intuitive" sensitivity and on their impressions since both knew the United States from personal, direct experience.

The range, the time interval, is relevant also in foreign policy forecast. It may determine the methods or at least the techniques of the latter. At this point we shall make a distinction of: 1) macro-sociological, historical forecast of a distant, historical development including such "macropolitical" changes in the nature of society, in its political and social systems, technology, ideology and emerging socio-political problems as well as in the distribution of power; and 2) long-range strategies, which in turn will affect the general system of international relations and result in respective "responses" within the balance of power which may lead to "realignments" or shifts in coalition —*mutatis mutandis* like in a coalition game, shifts in distribution of power, due to such strategies, may prompt the actors in search of security to change their partners (allies); 3) medium or short-range strategies, concerned with stages, intermediate goals, the milestones of long-range or grand strategies,¹¹ and 4) courses of action or policies within a limited space and time span.

The anticipation of the future of European civilization is a different problem than exploration, and forecast of future courses of policy of the German government under Adolph Hitler (long range strategies and stages of such strategies).

Now we shall reduce the concept of "international environment" and roughly define as "international systems" a dominant pattern of relations between states, governments, as well as relations between ideological and national groups. Courses of actions or policies, as well as the responses to the latter, operate within such systems.

The purpose of international policies (actions) may be: *a*) the maintenance of the existing distribution of power and influence within the system, *b*) change in this distribution, *c*) maintenance of the existing basic system of relationship of states including the institutional set up, or *d*) change of the entire system.

The future international systems of Europe forecast of fifty years requires a "long-range trend analysis", an analysis of a "process" which suggests that several alternative trends are probable. One of them, a probable one, is the future tendency toward European community and European

¹¹ For definitions of strategies see B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, New York, Praeger, 1960 Edition, especially Part IV (p. 333 and ff.), "Fundamentals of Strategy and Grand Strategy".

integration. Long-range forecast of international systems is focused on institutions and international relations. In terms of range it is perhaps shorter than "historical forecast" and it is more specific. The existing European institutions and the success in the realm of economics may support such anticipation. The vigor of those institutions, continued actions in this direction, writings, ideologies and policy orientations as well as support by political parties may point to the further possibilities of plans for European integration. European integration and opening of the borders for migration of labor has contributed to the decline of unemployment in Italy and other countries suffering from unemployment. The past experience and the existing social forces suggest the general trend.

An attempt to explore the future courses of action of the German government under Adolph Hitler is however a different proposition. The former is an analysis of "process", a long-range proposal. An analysis in 1933 of Hitler's probable courses of action between 1937-38 is a "long-range" or "medium-range" proposition and a study of goal-oriented action: of strategies, their stages and actions. It suggests a different logical mode, a reduced causal model.¹² For the moment, we shall here only repeat that a different range of forecast may probably require a different logical mode or even a different method.

7. Assumption

Assumptions are data, aggregates of facts or of inferences and probability, which form a premise of a forecast. An erroneous assumption leads necessarily to an erroneous forecast. In "telic" forecasting it is necessary first to establish a premise or an assumption for my reasoning. In an action-goal forecast the content of assumption consists of data or facts which related to each other lead to identification of a plan (project) and, in consequence, goals of a political actor. The validity of my forecast may depend on the validity of my assumption. As was already pointed out before, one of my assumptions may have been in 1934, that Hitler's goals were expansion as stated in his writings, pronouncements and books. A closer analysis of changes in his domestic policies would support my assumption. Foreign policy and domestic, internal and external relations are closely interrelated. Changes in one area result in changes in another. Therefore, analysis of the relationship between domestic and foreign policy is relevant in forecasting. In this case, I am asking why Hitler's government is producing armaments, strengthening its propaganda against other nations and against other states, why it creates the climate of general insecurity and points to the need for Germany of gaining full security vis-à-vis its certain

¹² For a discussion of "process" and "action" approach in international relations see, Feliks Gross, *World Politics and Tension Areas*, New York University Press, 1967.

neighbors. When I ask "why", I ask about the causes, in consequence about the purpose, further the goal. Thus, in my analysis I may suggest that the changes in domestic policy are a consequence or a sequent of his foreign policy objectives and both reflect the future course of action. Thus a forecast of a strategic or "stage strategic" design is primarily based on a causal model. The causal model is a consequence of goal analysis. In a sense it is an educated "guess" of goals. The concept of causality seems to be essential here. Attempts to forecast a stage of such a strategy narrows even more the field of our inquiry as well as the frame of reference. At times when, in 1938, Hitler was pressing against the Czechoslovak Republic again the question had to be asked what are his objectives? Is his objective a greater economic advance and self government of the German minority in the Sudetenland or full control or in conquest of all the Czechoslovak Republic? In such a working analysis, his goals are assuming the role of the causes (antecedents) while his actions such as deployment of military force or diplomatic action as sequents (effects) of his goals. Again the causal model becomes a relevant pattern for forecasting.

8. Asking Questions

We may select in an arbitrary manner some of the major areas of research and scientific inquiry: 1) fact gathering, 2) description, 3) classification, and 4) relating of the facts. Fact gathering is primarily a process of selecting; relating facts depends largely on our objectives and on the frame of reference as well as hypothesis we do advance. For us the most relevant area is one of relating facts or perhaps connecting data or conditions (aggregates of dynamic, changing facts).

A piece of iron expands while heat is increased. In this case I connect the heat as one set of conditions with the expansion of the iron as another set of conditions. Then I may say, "The iron expands because" —the answer here is a consequence of a question: "Why" or "How"? Alfred North Whitehead points to the fact that the great scientists advanced our knowledge by asking rather questions *how* things happen than *why* things happen. But the scientists are asking questions addressed to the nature of things and are concerned with a different kind of data and problems than data of social sciences. To ask questions about human or social actions is to an extent (and we may stress to a certain extent) a different problem. Man's actions are not determined solely by his biological drives. He throws before him the goals and objectives which are culturally determined, determined by his values and norms of conduct and his perception of the universe of facts. Therefore, to understand human action a question has to be asked *why* a person or a government is doing what it does, *why* it is choosing a given course of action, moreover it is also necessary to ask the question *where* such an action may lead and in what direction it moves

or *what* the actor wants to achieve by such actions and “*how*” he proceeds (tactics). The question “*how*” and “*why*” in combination with “*where*” focuses again our attention on causality. These three questions are continuously present in an analysis of courses of action in the analysis of foreign policy of any government. How does our thinking proceed in such a “forecast”? We observe what might be called “political behavior” of a political actor, we watch his actions, also his symbolic communications, and we ask the question *why* he is doing this, *what* and *how* he is trying to achieve by these actions. By the latter we ask the question where, in what direction he intends to move. I also ask the question what means does he use and whether the means are adequate to achieve his goal. Here I am inquiring “*how*” the political actor is trying to achieve his goals, this question concerns tactics. The answer to the question is given in terms of causality since we answer the question: “The political actor has chosen a given course of action ‘*because*’...?”

The starting point of forecasting and understanding of foreign policy begins with the questions, “*why*”, “*where*”, and “*how*”. Since the answers are in terms of causalities this brings us again close to the basic subject.

9. Causality

Our understanding of the environment in which we live, as well as its changes calls for continuous observation and selective perception of facts or events. Perception of those facts or conditions, however, is not sufficient for understanding of the environment or the changes which occur. Essential in our inquiry is the *connection* or the *relationship* between events or conditions. They form the essential element of every scientific inquiry. Problems or relating events or facts in order to build inferences or arrive at conclusions are problems of scientific methods. Causation, connection between cause and effect, is only one of the models of connecting events or conditions. It may be necessary to mention here, that models of connecting or relating events, facts, or conditions are very few and modifications of those models are perhaps fundamental in changing scientific theory. In our discussion of forecast in the area of international politics three major models are of relevance: 1) moncausal, 2) the multicausal or pluralistic model, and 3) functional (in terms of interdependence). The moncausal or monistic model leads us to elementary concepts of causality.

We may begin with a tentative, working definition of causality. In this tentative sense we may define as a cause a set of conditions, events, or facts which by this combination result into change which in turn is called effect. G. H. Mead in *Philosophy of the Present* calls causation a relation of an event to condition under which it occurs. Stanley Jevons accepts a definition of causation developed by Hobbes, redefined by Brown: “A cause may be defined to be the object or event which immediately precedes any

change and which existing again in similar circumstances will be always followed by a similar change", and here Jevons adds: "These definitions may be accepted with the qualification that our knowledge of causes in such sense can be probable only."¹³

"That a certain sequence has occurred and recurred in the past is a matter of experience to which we give expression in the concept of *causation*, that it will continue to recur in the future is a matter of belief to which we give expression in the concept of *probability*", writes Karl Pearson.¹⁴

"By causal law", writes Bertrand Russell, "I mean any general proposition in virtue of which it is possible to infer the existence of one thing or event from the existence of another or of a number of others". In consequence from a lightning, I can anticipate or forecast a thunder. Although Russell argues further, that the "same cause never recurs exactly" —still, for practical purpose—the causal model has predictive quality.¹⁵

The concept of causation has been and is continuously challenged and revised. It is beyond the scope of my general consideration to dwell on this important subject matter. May we add however, that problem solving and forecasting, thus far, necessitates the use of causal relationship, the concepts of antecedent and sequent. Without further philosophical discussion, the model may be suggested just as a logical convenience, which is operational and workable due to its probability or validation by recurrence.

In a very simplified, rather rough approach we may distinguish the three following elements: (C) or the set of conditions which produces changes, and (E) a set of conditions which is the result of those changes. The first we shall call the cause or *antecedent*, the second effect or *sequent*. In addition there is a logical connection (l.n.) between the first set of conditions (C) and the second set of conditions called (E), in other words there is a logical connection between the antecedent and the sequent. In Model 1, below,

MODEL 1

$$\frac{C}{A} \mid \text{— L. N.} \rightarrow \frac{E}{S}$$

we may distinguish then $\frac{C}{A}$ as antecedent, (L. N.) logical nexus, and $\frac{E}{S}$ as effect or sequent. Separation of all three elements is of course artificial,

¹³ W. Stanley Jevons, *The Principles of Science, A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method* (1877 ed.), Dover, New York, 1958, p. 224.

¹⁴ Karl Pearson, *The Grammar of Science*, (1937 ed.), J. M. Dent & Sons, London, 1949, p. 99.

¹⁵ Bertrand Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1929), Mentor Book edition, 1960, New York, pp. 166, 168.

these are not separate blocks, they are mutually interdependent and interconnected. The separation is a purely intellectual operation and matter of logical convenience.

Now, this monocausal model of our thinking, although rough and primitive, is perhaps the oldest predictive instrument man has used. And in limited cases, or in certain areas of our experience this is an efficient and reliable mental tool. Its working, however, depends, as was said, on valid assumption or premises. We may take now a simple example similar to those Russell used. A hunter notices footprints of an antelope. The footprints seem to be fresh. He assumes that the antelope runs through the path shortly before he came. In terms of our causal model the footprints are an effect or a sequent of an antecedent which in this case was the movement of the antelope. I could infer the existence and the running of the antelope from this sequence. I can also postulate the running antelope (antecedent) will leave footprints (sequent). In this case there is a logical nexus between the antecedent and sequent. Thus, it is enough to know only one element either a sequent of the antecedent in order to postulate the second one. I can infer backwards from the footprints the past action. I can also project into the future the consequences of an antecedent. The knowledge of an antecedent gives me also the probability or the sequent, while the knowledge of the sequent gives me the probability of the antecedent.

Foreign policy is a complex social process but even here this model, under certain conditions has its application. Foreign policy is but a "telic" behavior of a political actor. The goal is the *cause, antecedent* of his actions, his actions (policies) are effect (sequent) of his intentions or goals. Again, to follow Seneca's advice: the road by example is shorter. Hitler's government begins a propaganda campaign against Austria. A next step is a pressure against Austria and the diplomatic level. Internal disorders in Austria follow, spearheaded by the Nazi party, still weak at this time. Now we have a combination of pressures on three levels: the level of propaganda, diplomacy and internal front. Soon military pressure and invasion follows and Austria becomes a prey of the German Reich. The assumption in this case is: seizure of Austria was a stage in an extensive plan or intention of conquest and expansion. The various actions mentioned before were means. The goal or the plan was an antecedent, the actions and capture were the sequent. There is a logical consequence, a logical nexus between both. A year later similar indicators of conquest appear. This time, however, directed against Czechoslovakia. After a violent propaganda barrage, a diplomatic pressure follows to win for the German minority in the Sudeteland area a greater autonomy and self government. Next came manifestations and riots led by the German nationalist party in the Sudeten area. Sections of the German minority grew violent and are obviously supported by the government in Berlin in their activities against the republic. Now again action develop on three levels: propaganda, diplomatic and the internal front. The ante-

cedent is very similar as in Austria. This leads an observer back to an assumption and goal identification: the stage strategic goal of Adolph Hitler is a conquest of Czechoslovakia. The entire composite of antecedents suggest this objective as a logical sequent. In consequence, providing valid assumption, a sufficient similitude of antecedents (analogy) supplies elements of my forecast. Again my forecast is a probability of one of the alternatives or actions open to Adolph Hitler. I postulate, that at this stage several alternatives are open to the political actor, this is one he may choose. I do not suggest that he will choose precisely this one. The verifiability or at least a logical strength of this forecast depends on valid assumption, which is based on sufficient similarity of antecedents, (analogy) and realistic understanding of past experience.

Now let us simulate a current situation in say, 1975. Let us assume heavy shipments of weapons and military personnel by the Soviet Union to Syria, Iraq and Egypt. In addition, we continue to simulate a situation of intensive military preparation in the boundary region by Syrian and Egyptian troops can be noticed. The weapons are offensive in nature.

We ask a common sense question: "What for they do all this? Why do they spend here so much money?" We think about consistent Soviet policies of expanding their influence in the Middle East, we think and discuss the probable Soviet strategic goals in this area. Those actions, are "symptoms" and symptoms are visible expressions of goals. Then we ask, "Why are they doing all this?", we ask in fact what is the purpose, what are the *goals*? We gather data to get a better picture about *means*, for we ask the question "How and what are they doing?" We ask also the question of "where".

The goals are the *cause* —the choice of means (military preparations) *effect* (sequent). In consequence by identification of the sequent and relating to less hard data, the probable goals, within a context situation (where) we discover also the probability of further actions (uses of means —military apparatus) toward goal achievement. This is the forecast —of one of probabilities. After all, missiles are not firecrackers, they may be adequate means to break the will of Israel. To discover the *goal* by asking the question why *now*, at this moment the neighbors of Israel are arming so eagerly. What we really do, to relate actions to intentions —to the goal. We connect two sets of data. Identification of intentions-goals, is in this case the pivotal principle of our forecast. The preparations are means for goal achievement —the probable goal: an offensive against Israel and recovery of territories conquered in the 1967 war by the former. However, the same "means" may serve only as instruments of pressure, to force an Israeli government's decision, which would be favorable or "more" favorable to the opponent's objectives.

It is however another probability: expected offensive of the Israelis, a "preventive Israeli war" and defensive measures of Israel's neighbors against such eventuality. Yes, there is this probability too. But a close

scrutiny of the nature of those preparations, of diplomatic pressures and background, permits to infer in what direction the "probabilities" move. The very nature of preparation, its massive quality, as well as relationship of those actions to long range strategic goals in this area may suggest a higher probability of an offensive, or of a pressure to force Israel to substantial concessions in a planned Geneva conference.

The pessimist frequently wins in a forecast. I shall not continue —only I shall end this case with a comment. An early identification of probable development may be a much more effective stimulus for an effective policy leading to reduction of tensions and prevention of a brutal and useless confrontation than a naive optimism. The facts, the actions, the deeds are paramount. This all might be elementary. But even an intelligent man, terrified by prospects of oncoming dangers and catastrophes, paralyzed by fear, prefers at times to escape and hide in an optimistic indifference, than face the harsh reality and search and accept sometimes hard or painful but still constructive answers, which at the end may secure a peaceful solution.

But let us return to the analysis of our modes of thought. Whether military preparations are defensive, offensive, or "pressure oriented", in this case of short range forecast, the inference is based on a causal model: the goal is the cause, the actions effect. Any attempt of short range forecast, anticipation in the study of goal-oriented, telic behavior calls for causal thinking. A foreign policy is goal oriented. It belongs to the family of "telic" behavior, and short range forecasting of future actions is here governed by the general principles and logic of causality.

10. *Stages and Goals*

The probability of our second Czechoslovak forecast was to a large extent based on the analogy of the first case, on the Austrian cases and more on our reading and studying of Hitler's pronouncements, promises and plans. The past experience supplied on this case the elements of our valid assumption about Hitler's goals and plans. The past experience in the natural sciences differs however with the experience in humanities or social sciences. Being ourselves human, we understand the meaning of human activities. We can analyze culturally and politically determined individual and social goals and anticipate the action in terms of those goals. A foreign policy oriented toward expansion, conquest and war is a complex proposition. First as was mentioned before, it requires mobilization of the political and in consequence changes in domestic policy which forms already a certain factual basis for our assumption.¹⁶

In the case of Czechoslovakia the problem was to discover the future aggregate courses of action. An aggregate of single tactical movements of an actor forms a pattern, a "strategic design". A single isolated movement

¹⁶ Feliks Gross, *Foreign Polity Analysis*, New York, 1954, p. 155.

of a political actor is meaningless unless put into two contexts: 1) against the background of his earlier actions; here we are asking questions what is the purpose of his recent action in the context of the past. 2) Secondly an action must be considered "in situ" —in a context situation. Here the analysis of the "strategic design" becomes one of the relevant elements of our valid assumption.

This brings us close to the problems of goals and goal structures. A large area of individual and group activities is goal oriented. This is one of the major aspects of our culture. In our individual lives as well as in social planning we seldom achieve directly the desired goal. The goal, however, supplies a sense of direction. We plan usually in terms of time and space. An individual who plans to become a teacher plans also to go to the high school, the college, perhaps the graduate school, in order to arrive at his "tentatively" terminal goal of a teacher's diploma. He plans his life in terms of immediate, intermediate and distant goals. The goals are signposts on a kind of milestones of stages. If the college diploma is a terminal goal of a certain stage then his immediate and intermediate goals of finishing the high school and then college form a kind of sub-stage of his strategic objective to achieve the teacher's diploma. A proper planning of his strategy of life is one of the conditions of arriving at his goals.

Rational foreign policy objectives are also plotted in terms of immediate, intermediate and distant goals or in terms of stages and "stage goals." All three in this case are interdependent. A policy oriented toward peace and nuclear disarmament may move through stages: 1) suspension of nuclear explosion, 2) limitation of proliferation of nuclear weapons, and 3) ban on use of nuclear weapons and the next stages may lead to gradual nuclear disarmament, in a planned policy of peace. A policy for European peace and European unity may move through stages: 1) Council of Europe, 2) functional economic institutions and organizations, 3) social integration, and 4) political integration of Europe. This type of peace policies are usually open and to a large extent obvious. No one makes secrets of the intentions and the indicator coincide clearly with the objectives shifting of goals, the flexibility of stages is a consequence of the continuously changing and dynamic situation. The intermediate goals as well as stages are not necessarily plotted "a priori." They may emerge during an "actor's" responses to all situations, when a new and unexpected situation develops as a consequence of his or other actors' actions.

Now we may move tentatively and in a very rough outline to a foreign policy of expansion and conquest. In such a policy first the intentions must be present. "Intentions" suggest a general orientation, a sense of direction not yet structured or organized into clear plans and objectives of conquest. Usually the goals are formulated in a general way. So were the goals of Hitler formulated in terms of conquest of Eastern Europe or Russia. To arrive at these goals the actor must move through a number of intermediary stages. We may call it "strategic stages." The Polish-German treaty of

1934 was a consequence of such a stage which secured Adolph Hitler security on his Eastern border while attacking Austria. Next the conquest of Austria was a stage toward conquest of Czechoslovakia, this again a stage in a plan of conquest of Poland, the conquest of Poland was a stage toward reaching his great goal of East Europe and Russia. How do we know, however, what a strategic plan or orientation of a political decision maker is?

11. Declaratory and Empirical Data

It seems to me that we have two sets of data for discovery of the goal orientation and the pattern of action of a political actor. We listen and read what our neighbor, the political actor, says and we look carefully—so to speak—at his fingers and what he does. Here are our two sources of data: listening (or reading) and looking (observing). Thus, first come his declarations, his verbal presentation of his ideas as well as his writing. We may call this declaratory data. Secondly, we observe the actions, the political movement of the political actor. We shall call this empirical data. In the third stage we may compare the relationship between declaratory and empirical data whether they coincide or not. If they do, we have a basis for a valid assumption about the pattern of action and goal orientation of a political actor.

If the declaratory data do not coincide as the empirical data, then we assume, that the goals are “covert,” that the declaratory data disguise intentions and objectives of the actor, what a government does is paramount, pivotal. Stalin is credited for saying: if one would do in foreign policy what one says, then talking would not be needed. Empirical data offer in such case the key to our problem. Now, single movements, actions of political actors are put and pieced together. We ask the questions: “Why such actions were taken?” “Where it leads?” The answer to these questions is based on the empirical data, put together in a logical pattern, which will suggest the direction of even the objectives. The writings of a totalitarian leader often indicated the intentions (general orientation, sense of direction), the official pronouncement however usually “cover” the “real” objectives, such as conquest or domination of the minor nations.

This is not yet enough. Actions of a political decision-maker must be related not only to his own previous actions, but to the entire political situation on this planet, to his movements in other areas of the world, or in other international agencies. Forecasting requires constant relating of our problem to the entire planet. The map of the globe is an essential aid. When we ask our questions “when”, “how”, and “where” we must look at the map.

The declaratory data are usually easily accessible. The political actor frequently writes about his basic ideas and his concept of strategy, political strategy and tactics. We have such documents for instance of Josef Stalin

who delivered a series of lectures at the University of Sverdlovsk in 1926, in which he presented his theory of political strategy and tactics, published later in *Pravda* and many times reprinted in collective works of Stalin. This is, to be sure, an intelligent treatise which contained general ideas applicable not only for conquest but also as general political strategy. Throughout his political life Stalin followed his theoretical models. His actions could be understood, when interpreted within his general, goal-oriented model. On the other pole of the spectrum, Adolph Hitler verbalized frequently his objectives and he also identified them in his writings. Empirical data are of great relevance here. An analyst considers whether single actions and single stages are interrelated into a (strategic) pattern and are conducive to the achievement of the strategic objective, and if they are, they suggest a policy direction. In a sense, empirical data may validate the declaratory one.

Thus the empirical data supply important material for understanding the general strategic pattern. The analyst observes the composition and context of political moves, identifies stage objectives. From this he assumes not only the direction and the objectives but also the way the political actor acts, the way his tactical movements are structured within the stage, the technique by which he arrives at his goals. In short, the analyst tries to identify what we may call the political behavior of an actor.

It seems to me that the declaratory and the empirical data form the basis for forecast assumption. A study of political strategy and tactics, especially in the twentieth century teaches us that there are only a few major strategic and tactical patterns. A political actor usually develops one preferred pattern of action which he repeats throughout his political life. This is especially the case when his political strategy is successful or if it reflects his convictions and philosophy, as well as style. This may be as well a strategy of cautious movements, of avoiding decision and human suffering or, on the other hand, an aggressive, brutal and disregarding human misery. The strategy reflects also values and personality of the decision maker. After all, successful burglars repeat "tactics" and techniques. This forms a part of the clues which lead to their discovery.

Once a pattern of action is successful, an aggressor usually repeats his political strategy and tactics. We may ask then the question why the prospective victims do not anticipate the dangers? First of all, an aggressor splits alliances, debilitates future victims to a point that there is very little choice left. Furthermore, it is in the nature of human emotions of a victim to avoid even intellectually the prospects of a catastrophe and delude oneself about the intentions of the aggressor. But once a pattern is established, a relative probability exist that it will be repeated by the same actor under similar or opportune conditions. That is one of the elements of our assumption.

The empirical compared with the declaratory data gives us the basis for understanding of the objectives while the analysis of the strategic pattern of the political actor gives us the understanding of the stage and of the

move. Our assumption is, however, only to use the words of a dictionary —evidence that leads to probability. Our forecast based on this probability is also solely a hypothesis of one of possible courses of action. To repeat, the assumption consists of:

1. Declaratory data: here are writings, official and non-official statements of the decision maker.
2. Empirical data: are the actual moves political, economic, diplomatic or military compared with official statements. Here also belong the “factors” —such as economic, political, military preparedness or capabilities. We ask questions and compare: “What the actor says and what he does?”
3. Strategic pattern: political, economic, military moves or actions are carefully related to each other. The fragments put together suggest a “wholeness”, a pattern, which may emerge when various present moves are connected with past courses of action. We look for mutual interdependence and relationship of “parts” (moves), which together give us a picture of the “totality”, of the total structure of the strategic design. We ask: “Why is he doing what he does?” “Where will it lead?”, “How does it relate logically to previous actions?”, and “What objectives does it suggest?”
4. Past experience: past experience is extended beyond the empirical data and beyond the analysis of strategic pattern. We go back to the more distant historical past to our past experience in human behavior, in our quest for understanding and probability.

Hitler declares, that annexation of Austria is his ultimate goal. A year after —to return to our example— we compare his declaration, (declaratory data) with the present action. His actions contradict the latter. However, writings of Hitler, other declaratory material points to his intentions of conquest of Eastern Europe. The present actions —massing of the Army, diplomatic pressures, propaganda— form the empirical data. Now the empirical data are ordered into a strategic pattern: 1) Germany secures temporarily its North-Eastern (Polish) border by the German-Polish Treaty (1934), 2) annexes Austria, 3) moves against Czechoslovakia in a similar tactical-strategic pattern. This may suggest a probable future thrust against Poland, the Balkans or Russia through Rumania.

Past experience of Hitler as a ruthless Nazi leader, past experience of his disloyalty, mendacity and breaking of the peace treaties, past experience of his position in the German power structure, of absence of resistance, past experience of mobilization of national fanaticism, furthermore past experience of timidity of Western Powers and current politics of Poland and Hungary points to isolation of Czechoslovakia, and probability of a ruthless and successful conquest, as well as future obliteration of the Czech Republic.

All these four elements form the content of our general assumption or hypothesis of intentions and objectives. From the assumption, I deduct a "particular" objective, an objective of the present political actions. The objective is an antecedent. Action form the sequents or effects. Relating both, I may point to the future objectives.


We may reduce now the simple causal model to the three major states of our reasoning. We may follow Short Range (S. R.) Model 2 of this paper. The first stage is called assumption. At this stage an analyst is trying to establish the strategic pattern,¹⁷ and marshal as much material as he needs to get the elements out of the past experience which would give a higher validity to his assumption. He is trying above all to check the declaratory data against the empirical and on this basis he discovers the general pattern of political behavior of the actor, and above all *identifies his objectives*. In the second stage as a matter of logical convenience we postulate the objectives of the political actor as an antecedent-cause.

Model 2


1. Assumption

- a] Declaratory Data
- b) Empirical Data
- c) Strategic Pattern
- d) Past Experience

2. Antecedent



3. Sequents



The objectives, combined with will and capabilities —we forecast now— may result in third stage effective actions —a sequent and effect which is forecasted or later observed. Action in turn —we continue to forecast— may lead to goal achievement or frustration. If frustrated, goals may be substituted;¹⁸ if successful, achieved, they may form a terminal point of a strategic stage, and become an initial antecedent of the next strategic stage.

* Strategic stage goal. A strategic stage is a section, a segment of a long-range strategy. The forecasted action points to a stage goal (short-range, or relatively short-range).

¹⁷ See, Feliks Gross, *World Politics and Tension Areas*, pp. 162-226.

¹⁸ As above, pp. 29 foll.

12. Criticism of SR Model 2

We may return now to the criticism of this model, by pointing out its weaknesses. First of all, the strength of the forecast depends largely on the validity of its assumptions. The antecedent and to an extent the assumption is in turn based on analogy, on a type of analogy which de Jouvenel would call "sufficient similarity of causes." The sufficiency of the similarity or the strength of the analogy is largely based on arbitrary evaluation. But perhaps the major problem is presented here by the theory of goal structures. A political actor sometimes does not have definite and clear goals of his political activity. But he has perhaps a certain sense of direction, at least intentions which at the proper time are crystalized into definite goals. There are cases perhaps where the goal structure in such a definite form as was suggested does not exist but only general sense of direction.

Furthermore, the sociologist and philosopher, Florian Znaniecki, in his volume *Cultural Sciences*,¹⁹ suggests that the goals emerge and change during the action. He sees the goals rather as a consequence of action or closely interwoven with the action. This seems to me a pertinent observation. A political actor who is successful in his action may draw conclusions from his success and modify his objectives according to circumstances and perhaps because of his success, as the Frenchmen say, "appetite comes with eating." In politics, appetite comes with success. In consequence, the goals may be of an emergent and dynamic nature rather than a static one.

Harold Nicholson in his brilliant book, *Diplomacy*,²⁰ says rightly that the "foreign policy" is "foreign" in the sense that it involves not solely my country's policy but also the response and policies of others who operate in the international arena. Thus the forecast suggests the direction of an actor's policies but not the outcome, which depends upon the actions of others.


The fact of uncertainty of human action must be stressed, the unknown, unidentified variables which operate in the international arena. The antecedent-sequent model is basically a moncausal partially deductive with all the weaknesses of such simplification. Its utility, however, of this model may increase by a modification. Instead of forecasting one single course of action of the decision maker, we suggest a number of open alternatives or alternative sequences. This leads us to Short Range (SR) Model 3.

Given situation (1), and my assumption (2), the objectives (3) as causes of future courses of action (4) are inferred. The antecedent (causes) (3) suggest a number (an arc) of (4) probable courses of action, or alternative effects S_a , S_b , S_c (4). In other words, I postulate that given a situation, assumption and objective, the following courses of action are open to the political actor.

¹⁹ Florian Znaniecki, *Cultural Sciences*, University of Illinois Press, 1952, p. 193 ff.

²⁰ Harold Nicholson, *Diplomacy*, Oxford University Press, 1964.

MODEL 3



The concept of situation must be stressed here. The strategy, the tactics depends on the situation, which provides elements of decision. A political actor, by his goals and actions influences the situation. On the other hand, the change of situation affects tactics, and when the change of situation is fundamental, it may also affect the strategy.

Thus, we shall call telic or action forecast, a method of forecasting future actions based on identification of goals and goal-related actions. The goals in such an analysis are postulated as antecedents, actions as sequents. The telic analysis suggests future actions toward goal achievement. The assignment of the forecaster is to indicate the "options" or "alternatives" of not one but possibly all feasible or efficient choices open to the political actor. "Efficient" means such actions which may be perceived by a rational actor as leading to goal achievement.