POLITICAL CAREERS, POLITICAL AMBITIONS AND CAREER GOALS

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I. INTRODUCTION

In a speech addressing PRI candidates to the Chamber of Deputies for the 47th Legislature (1973-1976), the then chairman of the party, Jesús Reyes Heroles, concluded with the following exhortation:

> Certainly without ambition you cannot be a politician, and it would be offensive to say that you are wanting in ambition. Because you have ambitions you are the candidates of our party... Ambition is the driving force of political action; ambition of the good law, the human ambition to stand out in service, not the ambition of helping yourself and pretending.[1]

Reyes Heroles was a historian and a celebrated political writer, but he knew the trade of politics from experience. His own ambitions led him to the Chamber of Deputies from which he made his way up to the chairmanship of the PRI, and later to top positions in Mexican politics, as he became a member of the presidential cabinet.[2] He, therefore, was familiar with the aspirations that PRI politicians seeking a position

1 "El quehacer de un diputado", *Crónica legislativa*, vol. 2, núm. 8. p. 60.

2 See Presidencia de la República, Unidad de la Crónica Presidencial, *Diccionario biográfico del gobierno mexicano*, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1983, p. 348.

in the Chamber of Deputies entertain, and the central motive of their future performance as legislators.

Studies of political careers have traced the complex paths leading to success in Mexican politics. In his study of the "labyrinths of power", Peter Smith identified two major and persistent trends in career patterns; the increasing importance of formal qualifications for promotion to high-ranking executive stations, and the fact that elective-office experience has become conspicuously absent in careers leading to the cabinet and the presidency.[3] The significance of these tendencies of career advancement has not yet been clarified. Information on career patterns has been regularly analysed from the perspective of the political *socialization* of incumbent politicians. According to this approach the political behaviour of public officials is conditioned by their social, educational, and professional background. Nevertheless, the typologies of government personnel based on characteristics such as ideology, training, and social origin fail to provide a reliable guide to their political behaviour.[4] A highly partisan body such as the Chamber of Deputies is a case in point to illustrate the limitations of political socialization analysis, as the diverse social and educational background of PRI legislators contrasts so sharply with their highly homogeneous voting behaviour.

Joseph Schlesinger's seminal study of political careers in the United States has shed light on the significance of career patterns for the understanding of purposive behaviour in politics.[5] Schlesinger argued that patterns of political careers were important not for what they show about the past experience of public officials, but because of what they revealed about the aspirations and expectations for the future of incumbent politicians. This subtle switch of focus in the analysis of political careers was inspired by a simple theoretical proposition of far-reaching consequences —that a politician's behaviour is essentially a response to his

3 Smith, Peter H., *The Labyrinths of Power; Political Recruitment in Twentieth Century Mexico*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979.

4 Typologies of high-ranking public officials originally distinguished between *políticos* and *técnicos*. Other categories were introduced later such as *burócratas políticos* and more recently *tecnócratas*. For a recent re-interpretation of this long discussed topic see Centeno, Miguel Ángel, *Democracy within Reason; Technocratic Revolution in Mexico*, Pennsylvania, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994.

5 *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States*, Chicago, Rand McNally and Company, 1965.

"office goals". The way in which a politician anticipates, or hopes to structure, his future constrains current behaviour; and hence his political actions and strategic decisions are primarily calculated on the basis of his office ambitions.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the political careers of members of the Chamber of Deputies. The paper deals primarily with PRI politicians as this party is the most important vehicle of recruitment and promotion in the Mexican political system. However, some information about prevailing paths of promotion of opposition politicians is also provided. Patterns of career advancement serve to assess the office ambitions of incumbent legislators, and identify the organizations through which individual politicians achieve promotion to elective office. Dealing with the political ambitions of legislators touches not so much on their personal motivations as on the arrangement of office opportunities that defines the goals, or rather the sequence of goals, that politicians pursue at different stages in their careers. Accordingly, the first section of this paper treats of the "structure of political opportunities", and analyses the consequences of non-consecutive re-election in terms of the office goals and career strategies of incumbent Deputies.

Patterns of career advancement indicate the sequence of office opportunities leading to elective positions in the Chamber of Deputies, thereby revealing the organizations involved in the politics of party nomination. Individuals seeking promotion to elective office in the Chamber have to advance to a "position" that renders them potential candidates. These positions are usually located in a variety of organizations which political parties link together in the process of renewing temporary stations in the Chamber. The second section of this paper traces back the careers of politicians achieving promotion to the Chamber to three different types of positions: elective office in other governmental organs, appointive office in federal and state administrations, and leadership positions in trade union organizations. These paths of advancement to the Chamber reflects the complex arrangement of offices and organizations that regulates political promotion within the dominant party, and which has come to prevail under the system of rapid rotation of office.

II. Motives and opportunities

Schlesinger's theory of political ambition deals with the motives and opportunities which prompt political action; it builds on one basic aspect of the operation of political institutions —that they simplify motives, and render the behaviour of individuals understandable and predictable. Institutions establish and define the central *private* reward of political action —public offices. The characterization of public offices as "private goods" is useful to distinguish political ends from the policy oriented activities of politicians; policy goals are primarily concerned with "public goods", which typically benefit everyone in general. Politicians as office seekers are the direct beneficiaries of the main private goods which are at stake in politics. The theory of political ambition asserts the preemptive nature of political goals; it reminds us that a politician is an office seeker before he is a policy-maker, and contends that he is likely to behave as such while he holds office.

Office goals are not constant, they change over a politician's career and are influenced by varying situations. Schlesinger distinguishes three types of office ambitions according to their direction and intensity. Ambition can be *discrete* as a politician wants a particular office for the specified term, and then chooses to withdraw from public office. Ambition is *static* when the politician wants to make a long career out of a particular office. And, finally, a politician's ambition is *progressive* as he aspires to attain an office more important than the one he currently seeks or is holding.[6]

Schlesinger's theory of political ambition highlights the enormous significance of the institutions that define how politicians are to gain and hold office. Although the theory of political ambition builds upon the American political experience, it provides basic analytical tools to "deconstruct" institutional mechanisms prompting patterns of behaviour and cooperative action which are central for the maintenance of other political regimes. The theory focuses on the study of rational self-interested behaviour in politics. The analysis of Mexican politics from the perspective of the office ambitions of political leaders is particularly insightful in view of the long-lasting, but mostly unexplored experience with term limitations for all elective positions in government.

6 *Op. cit.* p. 6.

The institution of non re-election has had a profound impact on the definition of a politician's office ambitions, and on his strategies of career advancement. The constitutional provision establishing a life-time limit of one term in office, which affects the presidency and state governorships is clearly designed to remove *static ambition* altogether from aspirants and occupants of these positions. Non-consecutive re-election represents a milder version of the same institution; it does not rule out *static ambition* but discourages it strongly.

The consequences of the constitutional restrictions on re-election in terms of career strategies depend on the interaction of such rules with other institutions and practices. For instance, the absolute prohibition to run for re-election has different consequences on the career prospects of federal chief executives from those of state governors. Whereas non re-election has rendered the presidency a political dead-end, this is not the case with state governors, who may still entertain office ambitions. It is not at all unusual that state governors move to federal politics through presidential appointment to an administrative position, or through promotion to the Senate.[7] The effects of discrete ambition upon the performance of the presidency are specially relevant in connection to the cohesiveness of the "presidential complex" —the group of offices that fall within the presidential-patronage system. One would expect the authority of lame-duck presidents over the presidential complex to be severely restrained by the transiency of the patronage system. However, the ability of incumbent chief executives to control the timing, and the outcome of the nomination of the PRI presidential candidate has allowed the presidential complex to develop into a highly cohesive party, even though it is dismantled each time a new PRI candidate is nominated. This ability has not been developed in state governorships, which explains the fragility of gubernatorial patronage systems, and reflects the weakness of the PRI in the federal states.[8]

7 A seat in the Chamber of Deputies rarely represents a significant office opportunity for outgoing state governors. Nevertheless, the leadership positions in the PRI delegation to the Chamber have often attracted ambitious state governors.

8 Certainly, outgoing governors can have some influence in the nomination of PRI candidates to succeed them in office. However, in sharp contrast with the presidency, promotion to governorships is rarely achieved through the gubernatorial patronage system. The great majority of PRI gubernatorial candidates (83.3 percent of those holding office over the period from 1976 to 1995) regularly come from positions in the federal

Office ambitions are not just the product of politicians' personal preferences; they are moulded by what Schlesinger calls the "structure of opportunities", which is determined by the number of office opportunities and the prevailing patterns of career advancement.[9] The constitutional arrangement of offices is central in the definition of the opportunity structure. At the federal level, for instance, separation of powers, bicameralism, and the prohibition of dual office holding have important consequences in terms of the number of office opportunities. Federal states and municipal governments add two further dimensions to the opportunity structure. State governments reproduce most of the constitutional arrangements of the federal government, although there are differences which restrict the number of office opportunities at state level —state legislatures have a unicameral constitution, and tend to be rather small.[10] There is a large number of municipalities (around 2000), although the political importance of units of government at this level varies enormously according to population and territory. The constitution of municipal governments is based on the *Ayuntamientos* (local councils) chaired by *presidentes muncipales* (mayors). Municipal mayors and councillors form a single political unit as they are elected together in straight-ticket ballots.

Table 1 shows a comprehensive picture of the formal structure of opportunities as it developed up to 1993. One of the central characteristics of the arrangement of opportunities in the Mexican system is the proliferation of outlets of political ambition, and the large number of independently elected bodies and offices. Mexico has a busy electoral calendar, with voters forming six different types of electoral constituencies, and going regularly to the polls to renew a variety of offices. Only senators and governors from the same state share constituencies. Al-

government (see Table 6). For anecdotical evidence about the role of the president in the selection of PRI gubernatorial candidates see Martínez Assad, Carlos and Arreola Anaya, Álvaro, "El poder de los gobernadores", in Loaeza, S. and Segovia, R. (eds.) *La vida mexicana en la crisis*, Mexico, El Colegio de México, 1987, pp. 107-129.

9 *Op. cit*. p. 10.

10 State legislatures have an average size of 28.2 seats. See Béjar Algazi, Luisa, "Integración y atribuciones; un recorrido por los Congresos estatales", *Crónica legislativa*, vol. 2, núm. 12, diciembre de 1993. Table 3.

though federal offices are renewed in concurrent elections, the timing of state and municipal elections differs from one state to another.

The most important long-term change in the opportunity structure has been brought about by the incorporation of proportional representation seats to the Chamber of Deputies, local legislatures and municipal councils. As proportional representation was introduced as a supplement to the original first-past-the-post system, it has had a substantial impact on the size of the opportunity structure, accounting for 200 offices in the Chamber of Deputies and 313 in state legislatures. But the most significant effect of proportional representation has been on the shape of the opportunity structure, as the institution has been specially designed to provide opposition parties a minimum role in the promotion of politicians to legislative positions. Proportional representation has indeed opened up new paths of career advancement by changing the rules of competition for some elective offices (see Annex, Figure 1).

The number of offices available reflects only the formal size of the opportunity structure; the real size has to do with the frequency at which new men attain office. This qualification highlights one of the most peculiar aspects of the arrangement of opportunities in the Mexican political system. Schlesinger suggests that real chances of attaining office hinge on two variables —the length of term, and the turn over rate, which together define the "opportunity rate". The immediate effect of the non-consecutive re-election institution is that of raising the turn over rate at its highest possible level, thereby multiplying the chances for new men to achieve office.

TABLE 1. FORMAL STRUCTURE OF OPPORTUNITIES
(Elective office opportunities in Mexico)

Office	*Length ot term*	*No. of offices*	*Type of constituency*
Federal governement			
Presidency	6	1	National
Senate*	6	64	State
Chamber of Deputies	3	500	
Direct rep.		*300*	Fed. district
Proportional rep.		*200*	Circumscription (4)
State Government			
Governorships	6	31	State
State legislatures**	3	901	
Direct rep.		588	State district
Proportional rep.		313	State
Municipal Government			
Municipal presidencies	3	~2000	
Municipal councils	3	n.a.	Municipality

* Changes to Senate constitution introduced in 1993 are not included.
** Including Mexico City's Assembly of Representatives created in 1987.
Sources: *Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos* (México, Comisión Editorial del Senado de la República, sep. 1991) and Béjar Algazi, Luisa, *op. cit*.

The turnover rate is regularly used as an indicator of changes of personnel over a period of time, on the assumption that no legal restrictions to run for re-election exist. According to this definition the Mexican Chamber of Deputies has a constant turnover rate of one hundred per cent. Nevertheless, although total renewal is true in the short-term, it is

not necessarily so in the long-term, as Deputies can run for re-election after a one-term break. The one hundred per cent rate of change in personnel is a good indicator of the degree of membership instability in the Chamber of Deputies, but to measure opportunities for new men to achieve office we have to discount politicians returning to the Chamber after a compulsory break. Thus, an adjusted turnover measure within the Mexican institutional context will take into consideration only those politicians entering the Chamber for the first time in their careers. This adjustment reduces the turnover rate of the Chamber of Deputies from 100 to 81.9 per cent according to data available over the period from 1982 to 1991 (see Table 2). This figure still contrasts sharply with the long-term pattern of membership stability that prevails in the United States House of Representatives, which in the 1970s registered a average turnover rate of 15.4 percent.[11]

The rate of turnover has a significant impact on career strategies. According to Schlesinger, a low turnover rate such as that of the US House of Representatives means that aspirants can project long-term careers, and therefore the rate can be expected to foster *static ambition*. This is so despite the fact that the US House has a fixed term of two years, which, on the other hand, means that potential challengers have frequent opportunities to unseat incumbents.[12] On the contrary, a high turnover rate, such as that of the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, is likely to foster *progressive ambition*.[13] Clearly, the institution of non-consecutive re-election increases the chances of aspiring politicians to become members of the Mexican legislature; but the impact of this institution on career strategies is that of dampening *static ambition*. Politicians are unlikely to consider re-election to the Chamber of Deputies as a long-term office goal. Naturally, they can be expected to seek re-election if they fail to

11 "Voluntary retirement" accounts regularly for more than half of the turnover rate in the US House. In fact, the average re-election rate for incumbent representatives over the same period was 92.6 per cent. See Bailey, Christopher, *The US Congress*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1989. Tables 4.1, 5.1 and 5.2.

12 Of course, a short term of office also means that US Representatives have to react promptly to the changes in public opinion, maintain close links with their constituencies and keep an eye on potential challengers. In connection to US legislators' strategies to maximize their chances to achieve re-election, see Mayhew, David, *Congress: the Electoral Connection*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1974, p. 194.

13 The relationship between high turnover rate and *progressive ambition* presupposes that opportunities for advancement to higher office exist.

find other opportunities for career advancement. But, the re-election goal is always contingent on the ability to achieve promotion, or to enter a different career path after service in the Chamber of Deputies.

TABLE 2. EXPERIENCE IN OFFICE OF INCUMBENT DEPUTIES, 1982-1991

No. of Terms	*53rd. Legislature (1982-85)*	*54th. Legislature (1985-88)*	*55th. Legislature (1988-91)*	*1982-1991*
2 or more	4.2	3.0	1.6	2.9
1	9.4	16.0	19.5	15.2
0	86.5	81.0	78.9	81.9

Source: *Diccionario biográfico del gobierno mexicano*, Presidencia de la República, Unidad de la Crónica Presidencial.

The effect of the constitutional banning of consecutive re-election on long-term career patterns in the Chamber of Deputies can be assessed by looking at the terms of service, or office experience, of incumbent legislators. Table 2 shows data on career patterns taken from a random sample of 325 Deputies who served in the Chamber of Deputies between 1982 to 1991.[14] It demonstrates that the Chamber of Deputies is essentially a body formed by individuals with no experience in the offices they hold; all but 18.9 per cent of the politicians who were elected to Chamber in the 1980s had some office experience, a figure that varied very little from one legislature to another. The low level of office experience, which averaged 0.2 terms for the whole period, confirms that re-election after a compulsory break from office is not an important goal for incumbent legislators. Certainly, running for re-election is not completely unusual, as there is regularly a considerable minority serving a second term in the Chamber (15.2 percent on average). However, as Table 2 shows, running for a third term is rather rare, and a fourth one usually out of question. This career pattern is partly explained by the

14 The size of the sample amounts to up to 25 percent of total number of members elected from 1982 to 1991, and is representative of each of the three legislatures elected in this period. The number of cases allow one to make generalizations about the composition of the PRI and PRI's delegations to the Chamber of Deputies over the period of analysis. However, other opposition parties are too small to be treated separately.

rising opportunity costs of seeking re-election. To run a three-term career in the Chamber 15 years are needed, of which six have to be spent out of office. Opportunity costs are on the rise as politicians gain experience because the limits to re-election in other positions, and the large patronage system in the federal and state administrations, mean rapid mobility across the opportunity structure.

Another factor that makes re-election unattractive is that there are little benefits, in terms of status and power within the Chamber of Deputies, to reward the accretion of expertise and seniority. Certainly, members serving a second term in the Chamber have slightly better chances to achieve a committee chair.[15] However, given the centralized system of governance that prevails in the Chamber, committee chairs have very little independent authority, and not necessarily a reward for expertise or seniority. Career patterns and membership instability have a profound affect on the organization of the Chamber, but organizational factors also reinforce patterns of career advancement.

Non-consecutive re-election, and a short term of office, make a seat in the Chamber of Deputies a fairly accessible position which can serve as a stepping-stone toward higher stations in the political system. Assessing the significance of *progressive ambition* among aspirant and incumbent members of the Chamber of Deputies involves the identification of prevailing patterns of career advancement. Expectations of political promotion build on precedent and established practices. As Schlesinger points out, "Because others have used a particular office as stepping-stone, observers assume that it will be used in the same manner again. Ambitions and expectations, therefore, interact and reinforce each other, and politicians treat their colleagues as though it had the ambition appropriate to his office".[16] Accordingly, to identify the office goals of

15 Committee chairs receive an extra pay of 8.7 per cent over the normal Deputy salary. The yearly salary of Deputies amount to up to 310, 500 pesos (approximately £31, 200). This figure is slightly lower than that of British MPs, who in 1995 received £33, 189. The salary of British MPs, however, is modest in comparison with parliamentarians of other European countries, let alone American congressmen. Nevertheless, taking into account the low level of pay in the Mexican economy, members of the Chamber of Deputies are not underpaid. See Silk, Paul and Walters, Rohdi, *How Parliament Work*, London, Longman, 1995, p. 37. Information about salaries in the Chamber of Deputies was obtained from the *Oficialía Mayor de la Cámara de Diputados* in July 1995.

16 *Op. cit.*, p. 100.

members of the Chamber of Deputies we must look at the patterns of career advancement of politicians achieving promotion to higher offices. We can assume that the extent to which the Chamber of Deputies figures in the office experience of politicians holding higher offices reflects the political ambitions of Deputies.

A seat in the Senate constitutes a natural office goal for Deputies. There are various reasons making promotion to the upper house of the Congress attractive: higher pay and other perquisites, a longer term of office, a greater potential for career advancement, and in general a higher status as the Senate is a smaller body representing larger constituencies. Also, the fact that the Chamber Deputies shares constitutional functions, and interacts with the Senate, regularly renders movement to the upper house likely. Table 3 shows the degree in which service in the Chamber of Deputies is relevant for political promotion to the Senate. The majority of two delegations to the Senate (67.7 per cent) elected from 1982 to 1991 served at least one term in the Chamber of Deputies. Table 3 also indicates that, on the other hand, the chances of advancing to the Senate do not increase for politicians who have longer experience in the Chamber of Deputies; the percentage of Senators who served two or more terms in the Chamber (19.3 altogether) is no bigger than the percentage of PRI Deputies regularly serving for a second or a higher number of terms in the Chamber (21.1 per cent). In summary, promotion to the Senate is achieved at a similar rate by experienced, and unexperienced PRI Deputies.

TABLE 3. SERVICE IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES OF MEMBERS OF THE SENATE, 1982-1991
(Percentage of Senators who served in the Chamber of Deputies)

No. of terms	*Percentage*
No experience	32.3
1	48.4
2	14.5
3 or more	4.8

Source: See Table 2.

Differences in the length of term affect career advancement from the Chamber of Deputies to the Senate. As the Senate has a longer political cycle of six years, Deputies elected at the beginning of the senatorial cycle leave office when no opportunities of immediate promotion to the Senate exist; to continue their careers in the Senate they have to wait for three years.[17] On the other hand, delegations to the Chamber which achieve office in mid-term elections, can seek advancement without breaking their careers. Table 4 assesses continuity in career advancement from the Chamber to the Senate. It shows that PRI Deputies elected in mid-term elections have better chances of achieving promotion to the Senate than Deputies leaving office at the middle of the senatorial cycle. This notwithstanding, there is still a significant pattern of continuity in the sexennial cycle of opportunities, as Deputies who left office at the middle of the senatorial term have a higher rate of success in achieving promotion to the Senate than Deputies who served under previous administrations.

TABLE 4. CAREER CONTINUITY OF DEPUTIES PROMOTED TO THE SENATE
(Difference between last year of service in the Chamber of Deputies and year of election to the Senate)

Years	*Period (1982-88)*	*Period (1988-94)*	*Average (1982-94)*
0	34.4	31.7	33.1
3	22.9	14.3	18.5
6	1.6	4.7	3.2
9	1.6	7.9	4.8
12 or more	8.2	4.7	6.8

Source: See Table 2

17 The 1991 mid-term congressional elections were exceptional in this respect. An amendment to the Constitution in 1987 provided for the partial renewal of the Senate every three years. The amendment was repealed in 1993 as proportional representation in the Senate was introduced.

Opportunities of promotion to the Senate are not equally distributed among members of the PRI Delegation to the Chamber of Deputies. There are only two seats in the Senate for each federal state, whereas the number of districts per state varies enormously according to population size. Thus, PRI Deputies from thinly populated states with, therefore, few electoral districts have better chances of advancing to the Senate than PRI Deputies from heavily populated states. Accordingly, members of PRI delegations from large states are more likely to have disperse office goals, which may range from elective office opportunities at state or municipal levels to patronage positions in the federal or state administrations. PRI Deputies holding leadership positions in union organizations can simply continue their union careers, which apparently are very compatible with the temporary holding of public office.

State governorships figure prominently in the career strategies of the most ambitious PRI politicians holding office in the Chamber of Deputies. State governorships are in practice the most valuable position to which PRI politicians advancing their careers through elective offices can aspire. It is in several respects a more attractive position than a Senate seat. Certainly, the federal Constitution provides identical term of office and same constituency for Senators and Governors. Nevertheless, governorships carry higher political status and much more power.[18] As chief executives of state administrations, governors have control over a system of patronage of considerable size; their ability to organize teams and reward loyalty places them at the centre of the PRI promotional structure at the state and municipal levels. The higher position of state governorships in the hierarchy of political opportunities is not only determined by power; there are fewer Governors than Senators, and thus PRI gubernatorial candidacies are disputed by a larger number of relevant aspirants.

18 It is worth noting that in the United States the office of Senator tends to rank above the office of Governor (see, Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 97) This is so partly because the Senate has a longer term of office (six years), and specially because, given the low turnover rate in congressional elections, it offers greater tenure potential. Most state constitutions have extended the length of term of Governors to four years at the beginning of this century, adopting the model of the federal Constitution. But the movement toward longer service has been followed in many states by constitutional limits to the number terms governors can serve. See Beyle, Thad L., "Term Limits in the State Executive Brach", in Benjamin, Gerald and Malvin, Michael (eds.), *Limiting Legislative Terms*, Washington, Congressional Quarterly, 1992, pp. 159-189.

TABLE 5. SERVICE IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES OF ELECTED GOVERNORS, 1976-1995

No. of terms	*Governors*	*Percentage*
No experience	60	47.6
1	45	35.7
2	17	13.5
3	3	2.4
4	1	0.8
Total	*126*	*100*

Sources: Presidencia de la República, Unidad de la Crónica Presidencial, *op. cit.*; Dirección de Comunicación Social de la Presidencia de la República, *Quién es quién en la administración pública*, Mexico, DGCSPR, 1982; Editorial Quién es Quién en México, *Los protagonistas* (Mexico, Quién es Quién, n/d).

Table 5 assesses the significance of service in the Chamber of Deputies in career advancement toward state governorships over the period from 1976 to 1995. Data collected on the office experience of state chief executives takes into account only elected governors, excluding interim and substitute governors appointed by state legislatures in the course of aborted administrations. The fact that 52.4 per cent of elected governors served at least one term in the Chamber of Deputies is an indicator of the potential for career advancement of PRI politicians serving in this body. Although outgoing PRI Deputies are relatively more successful in achieving promotion to the Senate, service in the Chamber is still a relevant office experience in advancing to state governorships. Table 5 also confirms that length of service in the Chamber is irrelevant in attaining promotion to higher office. Politicians with two or three terms of service in the Chamber fare no better in becoming governors than those with a single term experience.

The office of governor is, in reality, a distant target for PRI politicians serving in the Chamber of Deputies. Potential aspirants to the PRI nomination to governorships include not only members of the same state delegation to the Chamber, but also senior politicians, such as the two incumbent Senators, and top officials of the federal administration with gubernatorial ambitions. Table 6 shows the various sources from which PRI candidates to state governorships sprang over the last twenty years.

The federal administration was the major stepping-stone toward state governorships, as 35.7 per cent of elected governors came straight from the presidential patronage system. The Chamber of Deputies came third, slightly below the Senate, as last office experience of PRI candidates to state governorships. This position in the sequence of promotion confirms the regular presence of a small group of politicians within the PRI delegation to the Chamber directly involved in the contest for the party nomination to state governorships. Nevertheless, the fact that only 27 out of the 66 governors who served as Deputies achieved promotion during, or immediately after, service in the Chamber, suggests that in the majority of cases advancement to state governorships is slower and involves the holding of intermediary positions.

TABLE 6. LAST OFFICE EXPERIENCE OF ELECTED GOVERNORS, 1976-1995

Type of office	*Governors*	*Percentage*
Federal administration	45	35.7
Senator	30	23.8
Deputy	27	21.4
Mayor	11	8.7
State administration	2	1.6
Military	2	1.6
Federal judiciary	1	0.8
State judiciary	1	0.8
Not identified	7	5.6
Total	126	100.0

Sources: See Table 5.

III. PATTERNS OF CAREER ADVANCEMENT TO THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

Elective office experience among legislators reveals the extent to which political careers can develop within the institutional arrangement regulating office-holding. As Table 7 shows, the majority of legislators

(56.6 per cent) elected over the period from 1982 to 1991 did not serve in elective office before running for the Chamber of Deputies. Political careers tended to be rather short for those who did hold elective office previously. Naturally, as members of the party controlling the vast majority of offices in Mexico, PRI Deputies were politically more experienced than opposition Deputies. The PRI delegation had an average experience of 2.6 years in elective office, whereas the average for the delegations of the PAN and other opposition parties was only 1.2 and 1.25 years respectively. Yet political neophytes represented half the membership of the PRI in the Chamber of Deputies. This aspect of the PRI delegation evinces the difficulties posed by the existing institutional framework for the long-term development of political careers, even for politicians using the dominant party as a vehicle of promotion. The constitutional banning of consecutive re-election represents a permanent threat on the continuity of political careers. The poor rate of elective office experience confirms that careers which begin at local level tend to be rather short, as local politicians regularly fail to cope with compulsory rotation in office. It also suggests that strict restrictions to re-election have impaired the formation of a stable class of professional politicians specialized in capturing elective office opportunities at local level.

TABLE 7. ELECTIVE OFFICE EXPERIENCE OF PARTY DELEGATIONS TO THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, 1982-1988

No. of office held	*PRI*	*PAN*	*Other*	*Total*
None	50.5	70.0	70.0	56.6
1	27.5	20.0	21.7	25.5
2	14.2	10.0	6.7	12.3
3	5.0	0	0	3.5
4 or more	4.8	0	1.7	2.2

Source: See Table 2.

Patterns of career advancement serve to identify elective offices which are more likely to encourage ambitions of promotion to the Chamber of Deputies. Table 8 provides information on the type of elective office

experience of party delegations to the Chamber of Deputies from 1982 to 1991. It shows that politicians from higher positions, such as Senators and Governors, hardly regard an average seat in the Chamber of Deputies as a significant office goal, confirming that there is a hierarchy of office opportunities and a stable pattern of career advancement. Only a tiny minority of PRI politicians elected to the Chamber in the 1980s ever held office in the Senate, or served as state Governors. This minority can be important, however, as experienced politicians usually target leadership positions in the Chamber as part of their career strategies.[19]

TABLE 8. TYPE OF ELECTIVE OFFICE EXPERIENCE OF PARTY DELEGATIONS TO THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, 1982-1988
(Percentage of Deputies who held office at least once)

Type of office	*PRI*	*PAN*	*Other*	*Total*
Local councillor	14.7	7.5	8.3	12.5
Mayor	13.2	0	5.0	10.0
Local legislator	21.0	10.0	10.0	15.5
Federal Deputy	20.1	17.5	11.6	18.2
Senator	0.4	0	0	0.3
Governor	0.4	0	0	0.3

Source: See Table 2.

Politicians holding lesser offices can be naturally expected to consider promotion to the Chamber as a more valuable office goal. Table 8 clearly confirms this expectation, but also shows significant variations among offices. A seat in a state legislature is the most important stepping-stone towards the Chamber of Deputies for local politicians. This pattern of career advancement is perhaps related to the similarity of functions between the two offices. It is certainly of more significance for the state

19 Three of the six politicians appointed as leaders of the PRI delegation to the Chamber served previously in the Senate, and two of them served as state governors.

legislatures than for the Chamber of Deputies. Capturing the PRI nomination to one of the Chamber districts falling within state territory is likely to bear heavily on the office performance of state legislators. The low level of experience as municipal councillors and mayors registered by members of the PRI delegation (14.7 and 13.2 percent respectively), means that for politicians holding office in municipal governments the Chamber of Deputies is a more distant target, and that they enter politics with a rather brief career prospect. Having said this, it is necessary to mention that municipal governments vary greatly in importance, and so does their position in the structure of opportunities. The municipal presidencies of rich and densely populated municipalities are highly valued office opportunities attracting resourceful and ambitious politicians, quite prepared to run for federal office.

Opposition party delegations have been formed overwhelmingly by individuals with no previous experience in elective office. Only thirty percent of non-PRI Deputies elected from 1982 to 1991 had held elective office before promotion to the Chamber. Political experience among this group was restricted to a single three-year term in office in the majority of cases. The lack of professional politicians is a characteristic that the delegations of opposition parties share with those of the PRI, only that this pattern is more pronounced among opposition parties, for their operation as promotional vehicles to offices disputed at municipal and state level is very limited and rather recent. Information on career patterns confirms that proportional-representation seats in the Chamber of Deputies have provided the basis for the development of opposition parties. But it also suggests that the introduction of proportional-representation seats to state legislatures and municipal councils during the 1980s has created some opportunities for career advancement from local to federal office through opposition parties.[20] Politicians with experience as state legislators or local councillors represent a small, but growing, group wi-

20 The creation of PR seats to represent minority parties in states legislatures was prompted by the 1977 electoral reform, although the implementation of the amendments to the federal Constitution by state governments began in the 1980s. Representation of minority parties in municipal councils was another sweeping institutional change forced upon state and municipal governments through an amendment to the federal Constitution in 1983. In connection with the 1983 municipal reform see Martínez, Carlos and Zicardi, Alicia, "El municipio entre la sociedad y el Estado", *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, vol. 48, núm. 4, 1986.

thin the delegation of opposition parties to the Chamber of Deputies. This pattern may be showing an incipient form of professionalization among opposition politicians similar to that of the PRI, which is however unlikely to develop much further within the institutional framework of non-consecutive re-election.[21]

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE CAREERS

If advancement from elective office in municipal and state governments to the Chamber of Deputies is rather limited, even for PRI politicians, what do the politically ambitious do before running for a seat in the Chamber of Deputies? The fact that office opportunities in the Chamber are not controlled by a stable class of professional politicians implies that individuals with different career backgrounds are regularly encouraged to run for elective office. Career backgrounds of incumbent legislators reflect the promotional structure of political parties, that is to say the organizations from which politically ambitious individuals launch their assault on party candidacies to elective office. One of the consequences of the banning of consecutive re-election is that a political party such as the PRI does not rely on career politicians to run permanent *electoral* organizations. As electoral campaign committees mounted by candidates to the Chamber of Deputies are assembled from scratch every election, they result in improvised and short-lived electoral organizations, which have no reason to exist once politicians win office.

By preventing the emergence of a class of professional politicians, rapid rotation in office has allowed, and indeed encouraged, politically ambitious individuals serving in administrative positions to run for elective office in the Chamber of Deputies. The link between the federal, and state bureaucracies with the PRI has been one of the defining and distinctive features of Mexican politics, early since the party was foun-

21 Opposition parties are not necessarily interested in promoting career advancement from state legislatures to the Chamber of Deputies, as one may suspect. The PRD's statutes bar incumbent state legislators from the list of party candidates to PR seats in Chamber of Deputies in the following elections, and *viceversa*. This is probably a strategy to deal with conflicting ambitions within the party, but it is unlikely to contribute to the long-term development of the PRD. See Valdés, Leonardo, "Partido de la Revolución Democrática: The Third Option in Mexico", in Harvey, Neil and Serrano, Mónica, *Party Politics in "an Uncommon Democracy": Political Parties and Elections in Mexico*, London, Institute for Latin American Studies-University of London, 1994, pp. 61-75.

ded. PNR politicians treated federal administrative positions as political spoils, and demanded appointed officials to contribute one day of their yearly salary to the sustenance of the party. This practice of political taxation was abandoned in 1934, but no system regulating the hiring and promotion of administrative officials has ever been established, and a powerful institutional link between party and bureaucracy was to develop nonetheless. The lack of regulations on recruitment and promotion of administrative staff, and the institution of non-consecutive re-election have promoted a politically ambitious bureaucracy.

In 1960, a constitutional amendment was passed to regulate the tenure of low level federal administrative positions, preventing dismissal for political reasons. The granting of tenure to federal employees has had a limited effect on the patronage system. In practice, the hiring and promotion of unionized employees have remained in the hands of appointed officials holding "positions of trust" or *cargos de confianza*. *Cargos de confianza* constitute the core of the patronage system. The term implies that these offices are held by appointees upon condition of trust, but it also means that hiring is entirely dependent upon an informal system based on personal connections. *Cargos de confianza* cover a wide section of the organizational structure of the federal administration, ranging from cabinet positions to a large number of middle ranking posts.

The growth of government has transformed the federal administration into a large organizational complex providing fertile ground for the development of long administrative careers, and some degree of professionalization, despite the lack of institutional restraints on political patronage. Certainly, the advancement of bureaucratic careers is subject to political cycles. The regular renewal of the presidency every six years triggers a thorough reshuffle of the structure of appointive positions of the federal bureaucracy, from heads of administrative departments (Secretaries of State) down to the lower echelons.[22] But these cyclical changes in the administration have not prevented appointed officials from

22 There is a persistent low rate of re-appointment in new cabinets despite uninterrupted single-party control over the presidential office. This pattern of instability in ministerial careers dates back to the Cárdenas administration, and shows the uncumbered position of incoming chief executives in the regular renewal of the presidential patronage system. See Stansfield, David, "The Mexican Cabinet: An Indicator of Political Changes", *Occasional Papers No. 8*, Institute of Latin American Studies-University of Glasgow, 1973.

running bureaucratic careers, moving from one agency to another in the federal administration. Still, there is a significant degree of continuity which non-consecutive re-election precludes in elective bodies. Accordingly, in the absence of institutions regulating recruitment and promotion, the sexennial recomposition of the federal administration fosters ambition, and encourages the practice of administrative careerism, whereby appointive officials capture office opportunities that regularly open up according to the political cycle.

Strategies of career advancement in the federal administration regularly involve the formation of teams, or *camarillas*, of administrative officials, which operate as informal associations built on personal loyalty and patronage.[23] *Camarillas* gather around senior officials who control patronage appointments within a segment of the administration. But they are also held together by the opportunities of promotion in a system characterized by rapid office mobility within the bureaucracy. As leaders of administrative *camarillas* achieve promotion, their power of patronage increase and the *camarilla* expands. On the other hand, *camarillas* are highly fragile, and often short-lived associations which depend on the ability of their leaders to sustain the continuous advancement of their careers. As administrative leaders fail to achieve promotion, *camarillas* dissolve, and their members have to join other *camarillas*, or retire from public office.

Studies on patterns of career advancement have remarked that upward mobility in the federal administration has been increasingly associated with higher levels of formal education.[24] This trend reflects the prevailing strategy of promotion among administrative *camarillas*, which in order to advance to higher stations use patronage to enhance their technical competence and policy-making capabilities. Thus, strategies of administrative careerism have tended to reward formal qualifications, rather than political experience, in the sense of service in elective office. The composition of successful *camarillas* suggests that running in the fast lane of administrative politics has become increasingly incompatible with service in the Chamber of Deputies, and indeed with elective office in general. Very few officials achieving promotion to top positions in the

23 See Camp, Roderic, "*Camarillas* in Mexican Politics: the Case of the Salinas Cabinet", *Mexican Studies*, núm. 6, Winter, 1990.

24 See Mills, Wright, *op. cit.*, and Camp, Roderic, *op. cit.*

administration have had a political interlude away from their bureaucratic careers.

However, if the Chamber of Deputies is not an strategic position to strive for as an administrative careerist, it still represents a significant outlet of ambition for administrative officials, as it constitutes a temporary position that may lead to the Senate, or the governorship of their home states, thus offering a different path of career advancement. Table 9 shows the experience in administrative office of party delegations to the Chamber of Deputies. The figures displayed represent the percentage of members of party delegations who held administrative office at municipal, state or federal government at some stage in their career before election to the Chamber. The figures point to a striking and significant contrast between the PRI and other political parties. Whereas the PRI delegations are fairly similar to other parties' delegations in terms of elective office experience, there is an enormous difference when we look at experience in offices obtained through appointive patronage. The large majority of the PRI's delegation is formed by politicians who have held appointive positions mainly in the federal administration, and to a lesser extent in state administrations. In sharp contrast with this pattern, only a small fraction of opposition parties' delegations to the Chamber has had access to patronage positions in their previous careers.

The role of patronage in sustaining monopolistic tendencies in Mexican party politics has unfortunately received very little attention from political analysts. And yet patronage at all levels of government has remained mostly unrestricted, with the army and the foreign service being the only federal departments where a merit system has been established. Patronage has certainly played a major role in attracting ambitious politicians to the dominant PRI. Data presented in Table 9 points to the holding of patronage positions as the one experience that identifies members of the PRI delegations the Chamber of Deputies. The large number of patronage of positions at all levels of government have also discouraged the development of opposition parties, as patronage is a powerful resource in the hands of chief executives, and executive officials, to reward loyalty to the ruling party, and prevent divisions.

Table 9 also provides information about careers in appointive patronage positions of members of the PRI delegation to the Chamber of Deputies. Office experience in the federal administration was classified

in three categories according organizational level. The categories are necessarily imprecise due to the organizational variety of federal agencies, but they provide some general guidance as to the proximity of positions in the formal administrative structure to the President, who is the original dispenser of patronage.[25] Thus, *high* offices in the federal administration include secretaries of state, under-secretaries, and *oficiales mayores* (general managers of administrative departments). *Middle* administrative positions range from general directors (*directores generales*) to area directors (*directores de área*). And offices from this level down to lowest patronage position were classified as *low* level. In the case of appointive office experience in state administrations, categories are broader, and therefore more inaccurate, with *high* positions referring to offices which can be presumed to be directly appointed by governors.

TABLE 9. EXPERIENCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF PARTY DELEGATIONS TO THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, 1982-1991
(Percentage of Deputies who held office at least once)

Type of office	*PRI*	*PAN*	*Other*
Municipal Government			
	12.9	10.0	1.7
State Administration			
Low	16.5	5.0	5.0
High	17.7	0	5.0
Federal Administration			
Low	45.2	7.5	11.8
Middle	23.3	0	3.3
High	2.3	0	0

Source: See Table 2

25 This structure of administrative positions became identical for each federal department after the administrative reform of 1976. It provided the criteria to classify patronage positions in other federal agencies such as parastatals, nationalized banks, and so on. For offices held before 1976, I tried to find their equivalent in the present structure.

In reading the data provided in Table 9 it is important to bear in mind that a single individual holds usually more than one administrative position before promotion to the Chamber of Deputies. Deputies who come from middle and high level offices in the federal administration regularly start their careers in lower positions, and thus their office experience is registered in more than one category. The large percentage of PRI Deputies with office experience at low levels of the federal administration (45.2), reflects that this type of position is relatively accessible, and temporary, as the patronage system is characterized by rapid office mobility. But the fact that a significant number of PRI Deputies come from middle level offices in the federal bureaucracy, and top positions in state administrations, (23.3 and 17.7 percent respectively) shows that administrative careerists regularly enjoy good chances to capturing PRI candidacies to the Chamber of Deputies. And this pattern of career advancement reveals the central role of patronage dispensers —chief executives and executive officials— in the promotional structure of the PRI, as they certainly have an enormous influence in nomination of party candidates to elective office.

V. UNION ORGANIZATIONS

The picture of the PRI as a net of promotion from patronage positions in the administration to elective office in the Congress is as yet incomplete. The institutional framework of non-consecutive re-election has allowed for the development of a structural link between the dominant party and trade union organizations. The involvement of union organizations in electoral politics goes far beyond a strategy of pursuing policy benefits for union affiliates in exchange for support for the party's candidates to elective office, usually in the forma of active campaigning or financial contributions. What has rendered the tie between the PRI and trade union organizations so special is the long-established practice of union leaders seeking and holding elective office. The party leadership encouraged this practice early after the creation of the PRN, but it was institutionalized with the party reforms of 1937, whereby union organizations were granted a regular quota of party candidacies to the Congress and other elective office at local level.[26]

26 See Garrido, Luis Javier, *El partido de la revolución institucionalizada. Medio*

The significance of the institution of non-consecutive re-election in integrating trades union organizations into the promotional structure of the dominant party has often been ignored. But by establishing the practice of rotation in office and inhibiting the development of a stable class of professional politicians, non-consecutive re-election has allowed for union leaders to seek elective office opportunities, and pursue a parallel political career. The regular seeking and holding of elective offices by union leaders can take place only within an institutional context which provides for abundant office opportunities, and minimum electoral competition. Party politics in Mexico developed in this direction after the constitutional banning of consecutive election was adopted in 1933. Thus, by the time trades union organizations were formally incorporated into the party structure, organizing and running trade unions had become compatible with, and indeed instrumental to, the seeking of elective office in the Congress through the dominant party.

The incorporation of trades unions into the promotional structure of the dominant party involved the adoption of an internal arrangement to allocate party candidacies, which essentially consisted of a quota system. Trades union organizations were grouped into three broad sectors —one for worker unions, one for peasant unions, and a third one, vaguely called the popular sector, to accommodate any other type of union. Each sector was accorded a quota of party candidacies for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Studies on the actual allocation of candidacies to the Chamber of Deputies among the three sectors show that the quota system has proved a very stable and persistent intra-party arrangement. In the four congressional elections over the period from 1979 to 1988, the quota of the workers sector oscillated between 25 and 22 percent of the 300 electoral districts; the peasants sector's quota varied from 15 to 18 percent; and the popular sector, being the main body of the PRI, took regularly around 60 percent of the party candidacies (see Table 10). Furthermore, the continuity of the sectorial arrangement is also territorial, as the sectors tended to control the nomination of party candidates for the same electoral districts. Half of the districts had candidates from the same sector throughout the period; in another third a single sector re-

siglo de poder político en México. La formación del nuevo Estado (1928-1945), Mexico, SEP-Siglo XXI, 1986.

gularly dominated the nomination process, only losing it to other sector once in the four elections.[27]

TABLE 10. THE PRI QUOTA SYSTEM
(PRI candidates to simple majority seats in the Chamber of Deputies, 1979-1988)

Sector	*1979*		*1982*		*1985*		*1988*	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Worker	70	23	75	25	72	24	66	22
Peasant	48	16	45	15	47	16	54	18
Popular	182	61	180	60	181	60	180	60
Total	300	100	300	100	300	100	300	300

Source: Pacheco Méndez, Guadalupe and Pérez del Capillo, Juan, "La estructura sectorial del PRI y las elecciones federales de diputados, 1979-1988", *Sociológica*, vol. 4, no. 11, september-december 1989, pp. 59-73.

It is important to note that the so-called "sectorial structure" of the PRI is essentially a convention to allocate party candidacies. Sectors are not working political organizations, they are rather clusters of separate trades unions or union confederations. Certainly, in the case of the peasant sector, there is a single organization, the National Confederation of Peasants (CNC) which absorbs almost the entire quota of candidacies; and also the Mexican Confederation of Workers takes the lion's share of the workers sector quota. However, this pattern of distribution does not imply that the other organizations are organically subordinated to the large ones. In fact, the formal simplicity of the sectorial structure only conceals a complex arrangement whereby a great diversity of organizations share in the promotion of politicians to the Chamber of Deputies through the PRI. The popular sector more than any other reflects clearly the nature of the sectorial structure of the PRI, as it basically consists of a quota of electoral districts shared by a variegated collection of organizations, from the national union of teachers (SNTE), the federation of state employees's unions (FSTSE), the national confederation

27 Pacheco, Guadalupe and Reyes, Juan, *op. cit.*

of farmers (CNPP) to the federal and state executives (see Tables A. 1, A. 2, and A. 3 in the Annex at the end of this Paper).

By the time the quota system was adopted, non-consecutive re-election had already undermined the old structure of political promotion built upon electoral organizations controlling territorial constituencies; the nomination of party candidates to the Chamber of Deputies had become a matter for negotiation at the national headquarters of the PNR in Mexico City. One can only wonder about the changes of the organization of the PNR as the entire party in the Chamber of Deputies was removed from office in 1934 when the constitutional provision of non-consecutive re-election began to be enforced. But a thorough re-constitution of the party organization was achieved by 1938; at the initiative of the presidential PNR, the participation of trade union organizations in the promotion of politicians to the Congress, and the local elective offices was institutionalized. The quota system was said to introduce a pattern of "functional representation", whereby the "popular classes" or the "masses" would express themselves through union organizations affiliated to one of the party sectors. Luis Javier Garrido argues that this change was a turning point in the evolution of the ruling party from a "cadre party" into a "mass party".[28] And certainly, as the quota system was adopted, the government encouraged the formation of labour union organizations, and actively promoted the unionization of potential recipients of policy benefits to enlarge the organizational structure of the party.[29]

Nevertheless, it is not clear whether the quota system involved any significant change in the prevailing mechanism of representation. The functional representation argument, upon which the system was justified, suggested that union leaders would express in the Congress the interests of the masses affiliated to the party; but the question of the mechanisms through which they would be held responsible for their decisions, and that would prevent them from defining the diffuse interests of the masses

28 *Op. cit.*

29 The main target of this strategy was the landless rural population as potential beneficiaries of the land reform programme. Peasant unions affiliated to the party were given control of powerful incentives to organize beneficiaries into captive clienteles. Not surprisingly, the confederation of peasant unions (CNC) brought into the party the largest number of affiliates. See Garrido, Luis J., "Un partido sin militantes", in Loaeza, S. and Segovia, R. (eds.) *La vida política mexicana en la crisis*, Mexico, El Colegio de México, 1987, pp. 61-76.

at their own convenience, was never addressed. A more realistic view is implied in the "corporative representation" argument which suggests that union leaders' behaviour in elective office is responsive to the specific purposes of their organizations, and that such interests are different from those of the unorganized masses.[30] However, the goals of union organizations are usually so narrow that they seldom have any connection with law-making and the policy process. But more important, there is no mechanism whereby union organizations can hold their leaders accountable for their performance in public office.

To make sense of the political behaviour of union leaders in the Chamber of Deputies it is necessary to look at their individual goals. As they seek office we can assume that their behaviour responds to their office ambitions, and that they pursue strategies of career advancement within the existing structure of political opportunities just as any other politician. Therefore their political goals have to be treated separately from the institutional purposes of union organizations. Although the quota system renders office opportunities a by-product of holding leadership positions in union organizations, their office goals attach union leaders to other elements of the party rather than to their own organizations. The party link is decisive in achieving political promotion. The cohesive behaviour of PRI delegations in roll call voting on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies clearly points in this direction.

Union leaders' office ambitions accounts for the long-lasting practices which characterize the Mexican labour and peasant movements. A case in point is the practice of "collective affiliation" of union members to political parties. The PRI (PRM) adopted the practice in the 1930s as a supplementary arrangement to the quota system. Collective affiliation was justified in terms of the collective policy benefits for union members that would derive from the involvement of trades union organizations in party politics. However, corporate party membership has been primarily a source of private benefits for union leaders, to whom this arran-

30 Jaime Sánchez Susarrey maintains that trades union organizations in Mexico form a "corporative enclave" amid the unorganized population. See *La trancisión incierta*, Mexico, Vuelta, 1991, pp. 11-33. The interests of labour unions may in fact conflict with those of unorganized workers. For instance, during economic crisis the strategies of organized labour gear towards the negotiation of "collective contracts" with employers rather than in pursuing general benefits through legislation, such as higher minimum wages, which can back-fire to their affiliates with job cuts.

gement has guaranteed regular access to elective office opportunities. And this has been a powerful incentive to maintain a practice that involves compulsory membership of union affiliates to political parties.[31]

Whereas the PRI is unique in that it has institutionalized the quota system, opposition parties have also drawn on trades union organizations. The PAN has been an exception in this respect, as this party rejected the practice of corporate affiliation, and mounted an isolated campaign to make it illegal.[32] But the PPS, having been founded by a dissident leader of the PRI-affiliated CTM, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, attempted to reproduce the model of a union-based political party by creating a alternative confederation of labour unions; only to find that the PPS failed to compete with the CTM in providing labour leaders with that regular access to public office.[33] The 1977 electoral reform introduced powerful incentives for the politically ambitious leaders of union organizations which had rejected incorporation into the promotional structure of existing political parties, to get involved in the formation of new ones. The emerging unionism in public universities played a particularly important role in the organization of the new political parties that achieved legal status, and sought access to proportional representation seats in the Chamber of Deputies after the electoral reform of 1977.[34]

Table 11 shows the percentage of party delegations to Chamber of Deputies formed by Deputies who held leadership positions in trades union organizations of any type. Experience in leadership positions reflects the different significance of union organizations in the promotional structure of political parties. The fact that half the membership of the PRI delegation had a career in a union organization before election to

31 Collective affiliation has provided the PRI with an enormous membership, but at the expense of rendering membership a mere formality. See Garrido, Luis Javier, "Un partido sin militantes", *op. cit.*

32 See Mabry, Donald, *The National Action Party*, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1973.

33 Vincent Padgett explains how Lombardo Toledano's project, after stumbling against the reality of the PRI's political monopoly, was limited to a mere ideological opposition to the regime. See *The Mexican Political System*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1966.

34 Rafael Segovia mentions that the *Secretaría de Gobernación* negotiated aspects of the 1977 electoral reform with the leadership of the STUNAM (Union of Workers of the National Autonomous University of Mexico); the STUNAM was then deeply involved in the organization of the Mexican Communist Party.

the Chamber is clearly the consequence of the quota system, and a reflection of the compatibility of union careers with temporary positions in the Chamber. Experienced union leaders with four or more positions have a slightly higher office experience in the Chamber than the others.[35] In sharp contrast with this pattern, members of the PAN delegation have nearly no background in union leadership positions, which can be a consequence of that party's policy against collective affiliation, and its distance from the union movement in general. The rest of the opposition parties tend to follow a pattern similar to that of the PRI, probably confirming the role that union organizations have played in opposition party politics since the 1977 electoral reform. But unfortunately, the sample from which the data presented in Table 11 does not allow us to draw conclusions about the other opposition parties individually.

TABLE 11. CAREER IN UNION ORGANIZATIONS OF PARTY DELEGATIONS TO THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, 1982-1991
(Percentage of Deputies)

No. Positions	*PRI*	*PAN*	*Other*
None	49.3	95.0	60.0
1	11.4	2.5	18.3
2	9.6	0	15.0
3	13.7	2.5	3.3
4	8.2	0	0
5 or more	7.8	0	3.3

Source: see Table 2.

There are significant differences in functions and structure of union organizations which are reflected on the career patters of their leaders. The PRI has affiliated a wide variety of trades unions which have been organized on entirely different grounds. A case in point is the contrasting development of labour union and peasant union organizations. Peasant unions have resulted mainly from the organization of potential benefi-

35 Only 12 percent of Deputies with one union leadership position had a previous experience in the Chamber; this figures goes up to 25.8 percent if consider only experienced union leaders with four or more positions.

ciaries of land redistribution programmes. Although the long-lasting land reform policies of the Mexican government have created a strong incentive for the political mobilization of the landless rural population, they have provided no solid basis for the development of permanent and stable union organizations. Once land has been attained the incentive for members to continue contributing and participating in the union disappears. PRI affiliated peasant organizations have been kept alive by other incentives provided by the government through policy benefits such as cheap credit and a variety of subsidies to peasants and farmers. The survival of peasant organizations have depended on their ability to control access to policy benefits, and their influence over the federal agencies that deliver them. The link between PRI affiliated peasant unions and the government has become so essential that the leadership of peasant organizations usually comes from politicians who held patronage appointive positions in the federal agencies responsible for the delivery of policy benefits to peasants, rather than from peasants themselves. The quota system works in practice as an independent incentive to maintain peasant organizations which are used as vehicles of political promotion into elective office.

Labour union organizations have developed upon more solid basis. They provide collective benefits to a captive membership that derives from the regular course of industrial relations. Labour unions are not dependent on specific policy benefits and governmental programmes, although they build on legislation which has institutionalized their role in industrial relations and increased their negotiating power. Accordingly, labour unions have become stable and permanent associations, allowing the formation of a class of professional union leaders running long careers at the head of union organizations.

The usual pattern in which labour unions are incorporated to the PRI is mainly through National Confederation of Workers (CTM), although there are other union organizations operating independently within the party. The CTM has developed into a powerful national lobby for the negotiation of quotas of PRI candidacies to the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate and other elective offices at local level. The CTM has become in fact the corner stone of the quota system and the "sectorial" structure of the PRI. In 1990, it alone succeeded in blocking an attempt to reform

the PRI that sought to remove "collective affiliation", and redefine the quota system.[36]

VI. CONCLUSIONS

The institution of non-consecutive re-election has a profound impact on the strategies of career advancement. It discourages the pursuance of re-election as a long-term goal, and instills *progressive ambition* among politicians seeking office in the Chamber of Deputies. Consequently, the level of office experience of incumbent Deputies is extremely low. Non continuous re-election has proven in practice incompatible with the professionalization of politicians serving in the Chamber of Deputies.

If non-consecutive re-election rules out long service in the Chamber, on the other hand it encourages other strategies of career advancement that mainly focus on two office opportunities —Senate seats and state governorships. Promotion from the Chamber to the Senate is a usual pattern of advancement that raise expectations among many incumbent PRI Deputies. State governorships are more distant office goals, but the Chamber of Deputies clearly appears as a relevant office experience in political careers leading to the office of governor. In sum, patterns of advancement to higher offices show that political careers are orderly enough to direct and to guide the expectations of PRI Deputies.

Patterns of political promotion from lower offices elected at local level to the Chamber of Deputies show that, while the Chamber constitutes a significant outlet of ambition for local PRI politicians, incumbent Deputies regularly have very little experience in elective office. Political careers before promotion to the Chamber tend to be either short or non existent. Rotation of office at all levels of government has inhibited the formation of a class of professional politicians specialized in capturing elective office opportunities.

The temporary holding of patronage appointive office in the federal and state administrations figures as a relevant experience associated with career advancement to the Chamber of Deputies through the PRI. The extensive patronage system has allowed the existence of large presiden-

36 For an account of the attempt to reform the PRI during the Salinas administration, see Sánchez Susarrey, J., *op. cit.*

tial, and gubernatorial complexes that serve as powerful mechanisms of promotion to temporary positions in the Chamber of Deputies. The patronage system, and the institution of non-consecutive re-election have provided for the existence of a politically ambitious bureaucracy, regularly achieving promotion from appointive positions in the administration to elective offices.

The third significant career path of incumbent Deputies involves leadership positions in trades union organizations. A large part of the PRI delegation to the Chamber is formed by individuals with careers in union organizations. This pattern of advancement reflects the compatibility of union careers with the temporary holding of elective office, and the arrangements for the distribution of PRI candidacies to the Chamber, whereby affiliated union organizations have a regular share in the nomination process. Despite their links to separate organizations pursuing independent goals, union leaders holding seats in the Chamber are fully integrated into party politics, as they respond to the same office ambitions as any other politicians.

VII. ANNEX

Table A. 1. THE PRI WORKER SECTOR (PRI candidates to simple majority seats in the Chamber of Deputies, 1979-1988)

Union Organization	*1979*		*1982*		*1985*		*1988*	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
CTM	45	64	50	67	51	71	49	74
CROC	11	16	12	16	11	15	8	12
Miners Union	4	6	5	7	6	8	2	3
CROM	2	3	3	4	3	4	3	5
Other	8	11	4	5	3	4	4	6
Total	70	100	75	100	72	100	66	100

Source: See Table 9.

Table A. 2. THE PRI PEASANT SECTOR (PRI candidates to simple majority seats in the Chamber of Deputies)

Union Organization	*1979*		*1982*		*1985*		*1988*	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
CNC	46	96	44	96	46	98	54	100
CCI	2	4	1	2	1	2	0	0
Total	48	100	45	100	47	100	54	100

Source: See Table 9.

Table A. 3. THE PRI POPULAR SECTOR (PRI candidates to simple majority seats in the Chamber of Deputies, 1979-1988)

Union Organization	*1979*		*1982*		*1985*		*1988*	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Federal bureaucracy	37	20	37	30	30	17	24	13
State bureaucracy	31	17	27	38	38	21	54	30
PRI officials	36	20	37	30	30	17	34	19
SNTE	12	15	15	14	14	8	15	8
FSTSE	11	8	8	10	10	6	9	5
Businessmen	12	10	10	13	13	7	18	8
ANFER	11	9	9	12	12	7	8	4
CNOP	11	11	11	13	13	7	1	1
Military	9	6	6	8	8	4	3	2
Others	7	17	17	8	8	4	17	9
Missing	3	1	1	5	5	2	2	1
Total	182	100	180	100	181	100	180	100

Source: See Table 9.

Figure 1
Long-term change in the structure of electoral competition in the Chamber of Deputies, 1946-1994



Source: *Diario de Debates de la Cámara de Diputados.*